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Wednesday, 17 December 2025
New Edition of Frowein and Peukert ECHR Handbook
Tuesday, 16 December 2025
FRA Note on EU Accession to ECHR
Friday, 12 December 2025
Learning from Inadmissibility: The Latest on Climate Change in Fliegenschnee
On 11 December 2025, the Court published its most recent climate ruling: the Fourth Section’s unanimous decision in Fliegenschnee and Others v. Austria. This is the latest in the Court’s mounting number of inadmissible climate cases – after Plan B. Earth, Metabody, Humane Being, Duarte Agostinho, Carême, Engels, Uricchio and De Conto. The outcome of Fliegenschnee was to some degree expected – given, not least, that the case was never communicated to the respondent government. At the same time, it sheds light on where the climate case-law is headed: in particular, it excludes rights-based fossil fuel bans, and voices doubt about the applicability of the human right to property (Article 1, Protocol 1 to the ECHR) to the climate impacts faced by farmers like the third applicant in this case. Overall, it clarifies that climate applicants must, from the moment of their first application to the Court, submit evidence of their affectedness, representativeness, and inability to achieve redress domestically.
Evidence as key
The Fourth
Section found that the three individual applicants in this case did not have
victim status. Applying the strict victim status criteria created for climate
mitigation cases in the 2024 KlimaSeniorinnen
Grand Chamber judgment, the judges found that the individual applicants had failed
to provide evidence showing that they had been personally affected by climate
change.
The issue
of evidence – which here concerned proof of impacts on the applicants given
their young age, health conditions or work as farmers – had previously also
proved detrimental to the individual applicants in the Greenpeace Nordic climate case. There, the Court
likewise rejected the individual applicants’ claim to victim status, noting
that it had not received individualized medical certificates confirming a
diagnosis of climate anxiety or its severity for the youth applicants involved
in that case (Greenpeace Nordic, para. 304).
A second
issue clarified by Fliegenschnee concerns associations’ representative
standing. Representative standing for climate associations has been much discussed since the Grand Chamber recognized
its possibility and granted standing to the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen in 2024. Building
on this, Fliegenschnee shows that representative standing is not
automatic or a sure thing: environmental associations must substantiate their
claim to representative climate standing by submitting information about their
status and those represented by them.
In
Fliegenschnee, the Court applied the KlimaSeniorinnen judgment’s
test of representative standing for climate associations, which contains a set
of criteria concerning the establishment, national link, dedicated purpose, and
representativeness of associations. The applicant legal person, Global 2000,
had asserted that it represented the interests of the general public (para. 4).
However, the Court found that it was unclear whether the applicant association
pursued "a dedicated purpose in the defence of human rights in the context
of the protection of the environment" and represented affected individuals
in Austria, given that it had submitted "no detailed information on its
membership nor its statutes."
No right to a fossil fuel ban, but substantiation remains key
After
declaring the applicability of the right to life (Article 2 ECHR)
“questionable” and declining to examine the corresponding claims, the Fliegenschnee Chamber did engage with the scope of Article
8 ECHR. It found that this provision does not
grant a right to the measure sought by the applicants, namely a ban on the sale
of fossil fuels. The Court made reference to the principle of subsidiarity and States’
wide margin of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving their climate
change goals, as previously acknowledged in its climate rulings. Building on
this, it found that “Article 8 cannot be read to guarantee a right to a
particular mitigation measure by a specific State body under a certain sectoral
law of an applicant’s choice” (para. 33).
This does
not mean that States have no obligations around fossil fuels. In Greenpeace
Nordic, the Court clarified the procedural obligations that States have
when it comes to licensing fossil fuel extraction projects. It held that “the
burning of fossil fuels, including oil and gas, is among the main causes of
climate change” (para. 297).
However, it
seems that the Court’s focus remains on procedural and regulatory obligations,
and that here, too, substantiation and evidence remain key. This is reflected
in the Court’s rejection of arguments about the State’s obligation to devise an
adequate regulatory framework. It considered this point insufficiently
substantiated, despite statements by the government that current measures put
Austria on track to miss its own GHG emissions reduction targets.
Substantiation also remains key for the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Fourth Section noted that, aside from the proceedings concerning the fossil fuel ban, which was litigated to the Austrian Constitutional Court, no domestic remedial avenues had been used – although without clarifying what kinds of claims or remedies it had in mind. It emphasized that the applicants had not alleged a lack of appropriate remedies or made any complaints concerning access to court (Article 6 ECHR) or the availability of an effective remedy (Article 13 ECHR).
Uncertain future for right to property claims
One of the
central innovations of this case was that it called on the Court to engage with
the right to property enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention. The third applicant, a farmer, argued that her property had been
endangered because of droughts caused by climate change, which could lead to
crop shortfalls and impact her agricultural productivity. This reflects related
claims made domestically in other Council of Europe Member States.
In this regard, the Fourth Section was unwilling to contemplate impacts on rights beyond those already applied to climate change by the KlimaSeniorinnen Grand Chamber. It noted that the Court “has so far not applied Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the context of climate change and that its applicability does not follow from the current case-law” (para. 37). And even if the provision had been applicable, it held, the third applicant lacked victim status, because she would have needed to be able to show that she was “directly or indirectly affected by the alleged violation”. Interestingly, the Court seems to have left open the issue of whether a right to property claim would require application of the strict KlimaSeniorinnen approach to victim status, or whether it would instead benefit from the usual standards in this regard. The Court cited both the KlimaSeniorinnen victim status test applicable to claims under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, and pre-KlimaSeniorinnen case-law applying the standard victim status test.
Conclusion
Given that Fliegenschnee
was never communicated (meaning that no additional written submissions were
made by the applicants, and no government submissions were received), the Court’s
decision hinged on the claims made in the original application form. This
underscores the importance of bringing fully fleshed-out cases to the Court
from the very beginning of an application’s life, without anticipating an
opportunity to clarify or further document claims in a written submissions
phase.
Still, the case hints at the direction in which the Court’s climate case-law is traveling: away from evaluating States’ concrete measures and policies, and away from recognizing a wider palette of rights at stake in the face of climate change (e.g. the right to property). Nevertheless, and despite the mounting number of inadmissibility decisions in climate cases, Fliegenschnee does not exclude success in follow-up cases that bring evidence of affectedness, representativeness, and inability to achieve redress domestically from the very beginning.
Thursday, 11 December 2025
An Exceptional Ministerial Conference on the ECHR and ‘Migration Challenges’
The letter of nine
On 22 May 2025, nine ECHR (and EU) states published a letter, addressed to no one in particular, aiming to ‘launch a new and open minded conversation about the interpretation’ of the ECHR in order to ‘restore the right balance’. More specifically, they believe, among other things, that there should be ‘more room nationally to decide on when to expel criminal foreign nationals’. They also believe that they ‘need to be able to take effective steps to counter hostile states that are trying to use our values and rights against us’, including by ‘instrumentalizing migrants at our borders’.
The letter has probably set in motion more than the signatories expected. Unsurprisingly, many reactions have appeared in the blogosphere. Setting aside the letter’s content for the moment, Steininger observed that it ‘is apparent that the letter is not sufficient to account for an actual attempt at institutional reform (so far)’. Like Steininger, Ní Chinnéide and Sevrin emphasised that that this type of backlash or tension is nothing new. Meanwhile, Buyse wrote that, by choosing to publish an open letter, ‘the governments behind the open letter [are] putting a new round of pressure on the Court’. Donald and Forde added that, even though the letter does not explain ‘what they seek to reform, how and why’, it is clear that that the states ‘intend to change something’. So, although the letter is not addressed to the Court, it is clear that the Court is the primary target audience and that the nine states intend to initiate a change that is not yet clearly defined.
The AGORA group – a new ‘pan-European platform committed to open dialogue, rigorous inquiry, and balanced, evidence-based debate’ on ECHR issues – published an open letter on behalf of around 150 legal academics and advocates. The letter emphasised the need to discuss the ECHR system ‘in a manner that is consistent with the’ CoE values and standards, ‘in particular the rule of law and democratic governance’. The letter echoes the statement of ENNHRI, the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions. The AGORA group also recalled that, in the Reykjavík Declaration of May 2023, the CoE member states had reaffirmed their ‘unwavering commitment to the Convention system as a mechanism to promote peace and stability in Europe and the [CoE’s] core values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law’.
The letter did not go unnoticed among ECHR states parties either. To take one example, the office of the Belgian Prime Minister De Wever, who was one of the signatories of the letter, asked Bossuyt to write a paper addressing the concerns expressed in the letter. Bossuyt is a former president of the Belgian Constitutional Court. The idea was to ‘quietly circulate the confidential paper among European leaders’. In line with the paper’s recommendations, De Wever proposed not amending the Convention, as this would take too long. Instead, he would like to add a further undefined ‘interpretation protocol’ to the ECHR. As Donald explained, ‘it is not clear whether De Wever does in fact mean a protocol to the ECHR or, more likely, an interpretive declaration’.
To take another example, the Dutch parliament responded to the country’s decision not to sign the letter by passing a motion calling on the Dutch government to explore the possibility of modernising or revising treaties such as the ECHR. The Dutch parliament also adopted a motion in support of De Wever’s idea after he delivered a speech at the HJ Schoo Lecture, which marks the unofficial start of the Dutch political year. In this speech, he also addressed the issue of migration and the ECHR. In line with the second motion, the Dutch government’s position during the informal ministerial conference was that the participants should instruct the Committee of Ministers to adopt a political declaration at the ordinary ministerial conference in May 2026. This declaration should have the status of an ‘interpretative declaration’ (rather than a ‘protocol’, as De Wever suggested), thus providing further guidance on the interpretation of the ECHR in the context of asylum and immigration policy. Interpretative declarations are a known phenomenon in international law. The Court has firmly stated that it has the authority to determine the validity under Article 57 ECHR (Article 64 at the time) of ‘a reservation or, where appropriate, of an interpretative declaration’.
Council of Europe reactions
Within the CoE, the Court responded to the letter by introducing some evidence to the debate in the form of a factsheet about immigration. The factsheet shows that only 1.5% of the cases pending before the Court relate to immigration. Furthermore, the Court identified violations in approximately 6% of the immigration-related applications over the past ten years. The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights wrote that the letter contains ‘so much to repudiate and challenge’ and that it ‘posits evidence free claims’, which underlines the importance of the Court’s factsheet.
The CoE Secretary General Berset explained that ‘[d]ebate is healthy, but politicizing the Court is not’. He also emphasised that ‘[u]pholding the independence and impartiality of the Court is our bedrock’. In addition to outlining four ‘basic factual premises’ for measures to address the concerns ‘of some European political leaders regarding the issue of migration’ and the Convention, Berset proposed four avenues to address these concerns. I will return to one of them when discussing the conclusions. It is Berset who initiated the informal ministerial conference with the aim of re-establishing discussions within the CoE framework. As Donald and Forde explained, ‘the advantages of utilising established fora as opposed to informal back-channels to discuss fundamental structural or normative issues is that discussions are more structured, comprehensive and transparent, and the involvement of expertise ensures that any course of action taken is based on facts and consideration of potential consequences’. The conference also ensures that all 46 Convention states participate in the discussion, rather than just 9 EU states.
The statements delivered at the informal ministerial conference
At the conference on 10 December 2025, 27 states delivered a joint statement. 19 of these states are EU states.[i] The following EU states were missing: Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. After confirming their ‘commitment’ to the Convention (rather than their ‘unwavering commitment’ as in the Reykjavík Declaration), the states echoed the letter of the nine states in many ways, referring to ‘people who take advantage of our hospitality by committing serious crime’ and the need to protect their own populations. More specifically, they considered it ‘vital that the balance between individual rights and legitimate aims as per Article 8 […] is adjusted so that more weight is put on the nature and seriousness of the offence committed and less weight is put on the foreign criminal’s’ interests. Comparably, they stated that the ‘scope of “inhuman and degrading treatment” under Article 3 […] should be constrained’ in the manner they see fit. Neither a group of states, nor the Committee of Ministers under the Convention or the CoE Statue has the competence to interpret the Convention; this competence lies solely with the Court (Articles 19 and 32(1) ECHR). For this reason alone, the proposed ‘rebalancing’ under Article 8 and limiting the scope of Article 3 are highly problematic. Therefore, these states ‘support’ for the Court’s independence is merely paying lip service to this key concept.
The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights’ statement is of a wholly different nature and highlights further reasons why the joint statement is problematic. In his brief statement, O’Flaherty raised some very pertinent issues. First, he emphasised the importance of ‘impeccable facts’ and, in this context, described the claim that the so-called instrumentalisation of migration undermines national security’ as ‘unconvincing’, while also challenging the assumption that adjusting the Court’s practice will ‘impact irregular migration flows’. He also urged the states not to ‘throw the law in question’ – specifically, the universality of human rights, the absolute prohibition of refoulement, and the Court’s independence. O’Flaherty was ‘convinced that our peoples are not against strong human rights protections for everyone’.
Although Secretary General Berset’s statement is less critical, he mentioned that the letter does not reflect his views. He underscored the importance of political dialogue and the evolving nature and significance of the Convention. While describing migration as having a ‘human face’, he also outlined the ‘challenges of irregular migration’, including its instrumentalisation.
Conference conclusions
The first few preambular paragraphs of the conclusions are rather general, referring to the ‘need to preserve the integrity of the Convention system’, the ‘the unconditional obligation on States to abide by the final judgments of the Court’ and the ‘subsidiary nature’ of the Convention system, for example. The final preambular paragraphs address the ‘migration challenges’ that supposedly prompted the debate initiated by the letter of nine. According to the conclusions, these challenges include the ‘instrumentalisation of migration, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and other criminal activities in this context’. A category of ‘challenges’ that is highlighted separately is ‘related to the expulsion and return of foreigners convicted of serious offences, while respecting human rights’. Additionally, the participants at the conference acknowledge a wide range of issues that appear to be the result of a complex compromise: ‘the fundamental responsibility of governments to ensure national security, public safety and the economic well-being of the country, as well as their sovereign right to protect their borders, whilst respecting without discrimination the core values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and conscious of the financial challenges encountered by multilateral co-operation on migration issues’.
The operative paragraphs of the conclusions invite the Committee of Ministers to:
‘a) prepare
a draft political declaration reaffirming the obligation to ensure the
effective enjoyment of the [Convention] rights […] to everyone within the
jurisdiction of member States in the context of the contemporary challenges
posed both by irregular migration and by the situation of foreigners convicted
of serious offences, taking duly into account in particular governments’ fundamental
responsibility to ensure national security and public safety;
b) reiterate
its support for the elaboration of a new recommendation on deterring and
fighting the smuggling of migrants, with full respect for their human rights;
c) consider
how the [CoE], including through the possible creation of an inter-governmental
committee, can best address pressing migration issues and related
policies;
d) encourage the Secretary General to engage in discussions at an international level relating to migration.’
The first proposal is clearly the most conspicuous. It is difficult to predict the content of this political declaration based on the proposal, since the proposal is hard to decipher and ambiguous. The political declaration should reaffirm the obligation to protect everyone’s Convention rights in the context of migration challenges on the one hand. This almost seems to contradict the joint statement, which proposes reducing the protection afforded by the Convention to ‘address’ migration challenges, and is also not in line with the spirit of the letter. On the other hand, the addition that the political declaration should duly take into account governments’ responsibility to ‘ensure national security and public safety’, is more in line with the joint statement and the letter: the ‘migration challenges’ and the protection of human rights undermine the governments’ ability to fulfil this responsibility.
The proposal is less clear and less controversial than Berset’s ‘avenues’, since he proposed not only the adoption of a ‘declaration on migration and the Convention’, but also that the text of the declaration ‘clearly indicate how the High Contracting Parties understand the Convention in migration cases, including in relation to criminal activities’. This proposal signals more clearly than the conclusions that the states intend to influence the Court’s interpretation of the Convention.
Apart from its content, the form of the proposal is notable: a political declaration, rather than the interpretation protocol that De Wever proposed, although he may actually have meant a political declaration. Political declarations were adopted at the five high-level conferences dedicated to the future of the ECtHR, which took place between 2010 and 2018. In these declarations, the states took stock of the reform process, identified problems concerning the Convention system and proposed reform measures. I previously found that more than half of these proposals had not been implemented, primarily due to opposition from the Court. However, the Court did take a considerable number of measures to enhance its ability to process cases, it has reduced the number of interim measures granted, and it has placed greater emphasis on the subsidiarity principle in its case law. Secretary General Berset also noted that ‘[r]esearch and empirical evidence show that the Court is not indifferent to such political declarations and considers them in its judicial work’. Donald and Forde confirmed that ‘judges live in the real world, and they pay attention to the perspectives of states’. Therefore, such a declaration may be a way for the states ‘to inform and perhaps even “nudge” the Court in a certain direction’. Additionally, Buyse noted that the debate about the Convention could lead to ‘subtle shifts in case-law’. Unlike the proposal made by the Dutch delegation at the informal ministerial conference, the declaration is not specified as having the status of an interpretative declaration.
The timing of the conference at which the political declaration will be proposed is unclear. It could be adopted at the ordinary ministerial conference, which is due to take place in Moldova in May 2026 (the Dutch proposal). However, Berset proposed organising a ‘dedicated’ high-level conference, probably similar to those held from 2010 to 2018.
My conclusion
Discussions about the Court in 2026 will continue to focus on migration and the ECHR, and a political declaration on this topic is expected. If the declaration reflects the joint statement, it will call on the Court to significantly reduce human rights protection for (certain categories of migrants). According to some (see also here), this process has already begun and it may be reinforced by a political declaration, since the Court has not been not insensitive to such declarations. Despite the both legally and empirically questionable basis of their proposals, a significant proportion of ECHR states parties are determined to follow this course. However, since a political declaration requires the approval of all 46 states parties, its content will likely be more nuanced than the joint proposal, as the conclusions adopted at the information ministerial conference also suggest. Still, dynamics in the states may lead to states changing their attitude, as demonstrated by the case of the Netherlands, where the Convention became the subject of parliamentary debates. Although the Netherlands did not sign the letter from the nine states, it did participate in the joint declaration, which is likely to have been a consequence of the debates.
[i] Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden. The non-EU
states are: Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Ukraine,
United Kingdom
Wednesday, 10 December 2025
Webinar on the Rule of Law Crisis in Poland and the ECHR
Monday, 8 December 2025
Workshop on ECHR and Sport
Timeline:
The cover letters and abstracts of no more than 300 words should be submitted to Rima.Yustikaningrum@liverpool.ac.uk before 6 pm UK time on 16 January 2026. The cover letter should include the name or names of the author(s), their positions and affiliated institutions, and preferred email addresses.
Monday, 1 December 2025
New Session of the MOOC on the ECHR Starts Again on 15 December
The MOOC entitled 'Human Rights for Open Societies - An introduction into the ECHR' is taught by my Utrecht University colleagues professor Antoine Buyse and professor Janneke Gerards. This is the description of our six-week course:
'Human rights are under pressure in many places across the globe. Peaceful protests are violently quashed. Voting is tampered with. And minorities are often excluded from decision-making. All of this threatens the ideal of an open society in which each of us can be free and participate equally. A solid protection of human rights is needed for an open society to exist and to flourish. But it is often an uphill battle to work towards that ideal. Equip yourself and learn more about what human rights are and how they work.
In this course, we will introduce you to one of the world’s most intricate human rights systems: the European Convention on Human Rights. You will see when and how people can turn to the European Court of Human Rights to complain about human rights violations. You will learn how the Court tries to solve many of the difficult human rights dilemmas of today. We will look, amongst other things, at the freedom of expression and demonstration, the right to vote, and the prohibition of discrimination. And we will address the rights of migrants, refugees, and other vulnerable groups. And, of course, we will see whether it is possible to restrict rights and if so under what conditions. You will even encounter watchdogs and ice cream in this course. We invite you to follow us on a journey of discovery into the European Convention!'
Please watch this short introduction video to get an impression:
Wednesday, 26 November 2025
Lize Glas and Corina Heri Join as ECHR Blog Editors
Monday, 24 November 2025
EIN-DRI 2025 Rule of Law Report Launch
Friday, 21 November 2025
New Book on Intersectionality and the ECHR
Wednesday, 19 November 2025
Call to Sign an Open Letter Regarding the Future of the European Convention on Human Rights
In recent months,
several Council of Europe member states have portrayed the ECHR and the ECtHR
as obstacles to addressing migration issues in Europe. Some states have openly criticised
the Court, while others have even suggested withdrawing from the
Convention. It is in response to these worrying initiatives, that a number of academics
working in the ECHR law have established
the Agora Group, an independent, pan-European platform committed to open dialogue and balanced,
evidence-based debate on key issues concerning the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). The Agora Group now counts nearly 800 colleagues
from all parts of Europe.It has come to our
attention that the Council of Europe will soon establish an intergovernmental
forum to discuss the concerns of member States as regards the ECtHR and the
interpretation of Convention rights, particularly Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. Discussions
held within the Council of Europe are welcome. However, the Agora Group has prepared an open
letter to call on all those involved to ensure that such discussions are
conducted in good faith and in a manner that respects the independence of
the Court and the object and purpose of the Convention and the Statute of the
Council of Europe. Failure to do so could significantly undermine the
Convention system as a whole.
In the spirit of constructive engagement, and considering the importance of
these initiatives from a large number of states, we invite all experts and
academics working in the field of human rights to consider signing this open
letter from the AGORA Group to the Council of Europe leadership. The letter
will be formally issued to the Council of Europe next week.
Click here to read and sign the open letter.
Call for Abstracts: Revisiting the ECHR
This is the call for abstracts:
'What started as an open letter in May 2025 has culminated in an increasingly articulate call by a large group of European leaders to revisit and reform the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). These leaders have pointed to the interpretation of the Convention as an impediment to policymaking and states’ interests, particularly in (but not limited to) migration matters. But what does it mean to point at Strasbourg and its judges as a roadblock to democratic governance? And how can and may governments address this issue?
While the political plans are still taking shape, the changing playing field calls for in-depth academic engagement. With this conference, the Human Rights Research Group at KU Leuven will create a space for open and balanced debate on the possibilities for reform and their implications.
Authors of selected abstracts will be invited to develop these into full papers for publication in either an edited volume or a special issue.
We particularly invite abstracts that touch upon the following topics:
• Dialogue between the ECtHR and national authorities
• The asserted need to reform the ECHR and its judicial machinery
• The different possibilities and mechanisms to revisit the interpretation of the ECHR
• The role of different actors in driving change at the Court
• (Supranational) separation of powers
• The promise and limits of evolutive interpretation
• ECHR and migration
• The role of the ECHR within international migration law
• Tensions between the ECHR and particular states
Submission guidelines: Abstracts (max. 500 words) should be submitted to both koen.lemmens at kuleuven.be and eva.sevrin at kuleuven.be by 17 January 2026. Selected participants will be notified by 29 January 2026. For any inquiries, please contact the two organisers.'




