E.A. v. France: Judicial revictimisation of a survivor of sadistic sexual harassment at work. Ignoring a coercive control context to impute ‘consent’ to the victim

By Margarita S. Ilieva

Introduction

On 4 September 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) rendered a landmark judgment in E.A. and Association européenne contre les violences faites aux femmes au travail v. France. For the first time, the Court: 1) mapped criteria to determine lacking consent in sexual violence (SV) cases; 2) used, and defined, coercive control in sexual relationships; 3) established that a coercive control context is relevant to determining consent; 4) held that using past agreement coerced in a controlling relationship to derive consent to sex acts is victim blaming (‘culpabilisant, stigmatisant’), and, therefore, revictimisation barring victims’ access to justice. Yet, as in the other three cases of workplace sexual harassment, the Court ignored the crux of the matter, namely, gender discrimination.
 
After summarising the facts and the judgment, I will discuss this and other gaps, as well as the precedential value of E.A., against the backdrop of earlier SV cases.
 
Facts
 
E.A. suffered coercive control in a violent sexual relationship with a supervisor. She was 26 years old, an assistant pharmacist in training, on temporary contract. Her abuser, the department head, was 16 years older. (§§4-5, 7-8, 65) Their relationship was sadomasochistic, with E.A. receiving severe and frequent degrading treatment, beating, and forced sexual acts, including anal penetration. (§20) She suffered bleeding, bruises, inflammation, and pain while walking. (§28) He had her sign a ‘contract between the master and his bitch’, which listed her ‘duties’ to:

‘regularly suck her master’; wear a collar; accept to be ‘fucked by others in the presence of her master’; inform her ‘master’ when going out and wear a ‘chastity belt’; ‘take care of/ massage her master’s dick’; act ‘obedient and devoted to her master’; wear clothes, underwear, and makeup chosen by her ‘master’; eat from a bowl at her ‘master’s feet’; ‘pee with the door open for her master to hear daily’; send her ‘master’ a daily photo with her underwear lowered; send him her daily agenda; take beatings on her behind when not respecting his ‘orders’; and more. (§11) 

That contract had the abuser’s professional seal as head on it. (§11)
 
The abuser had established domination over her, keeping her in dependency. He demanded sex at work and that she say she was his ‘shit’. He urinated on her to ‘mark his territory’ and forced her to use an email address entitled chiennkb@laposte.net (‘bitch[his initials]’). E.A. unsuccessfully tried to break up, which exacerbated his professional harassment of her. (§21) He threatened her with professional consequences and often devalued and humiliated her before colleagues. (§§15, 25, 30)
 
E.A. feared his influence on her professional future, including regarding a procedure to obtain permanent employment. With a fixed-term contract, she risked having to cover her tuition’s cost if she left. (§26)
 
E.A. was diagnosed with severe PTSD and depression and placed on indefinite medical leave. (§§9, 22) She was hospitalised in a psychiatry for a long period. She was assessed as ‘destroyed in terms of psychological balance’, displaying ‘hostage syndrome’, with symptoms typical of SV victims. The psychiatrist stressed that her vulnerability could not be unknown to her abuser. (§37)
 
During the ensuing criminal investigation, another expert confirmed E.A.’s symptoms and her relationship with the abuser being sadomasochistic and coercively controlling. The abuser had disbalanced and plunged E.A. in significant moral distress. Her statements matched her emotional state. (§51)
 
The abuser was investigated for violence and sexual harassment abusing a position of authority. (§44) However, the investigators failed to pursue the rapes and other SV E.A. complained of. (§65) The abuser was brought before a tribunal incompetent to hear rape cases. (§58) While the first instance convicted him, the appeals court fully acquitted him, relying on E.A.’s ‘consent’ given in the ‘master-bitch contract’. (§§66, 71-3) The last instance refused to reexamine this. (§76)
 
Judgment
 
The Court reaffirmed that an investigation into alleged SV must focus on (lacking) consent. Consent must express free will at the moment sex is occurring. (§140) The authorities have a duty to examine all the facts and determine consent based on their entirety, carrying out a contextual analysis. (§§141-2)
 
Importantly, the Court listed factors for lacking consent:
 
- an unbalanced relationship between accused and victim;
- victim’s youth/ age disparity;
- victim’s psychological fragility/ particular vulnerability, her capacity for judgment, (lack of) sexual experience, or drunken/ intoxicated state;
- any ‘freezing’ during the acts;
- the acts’ impact on victim;
- perpetrator aware of her vulnerability, and/ or using a relationship of trust or status; circumstances conducive to coercion, such as deserted place or multiple aggressors. (§143)   
 
Regarding SV in professional contexts, the Court reiterated that power imbalances (victim’s position of subordination) are an important contextual element when assessing a victim’s behaviour. (§145)
 
The Court reiterated that French criminal law is inadequate to protect against non-consensual sex acts (see, for a similar finding, L. et Autres c. France (2025) analysed here). Relying on GREVIO, it found French rape law to be deficient as the provisions did not refer to ‘consent’ (§148-9) The Court noted a growing European consensus to expressly define rape and SV by  lacking informed consent. The legislation must provide for criteria to evaluate free will. (§150)

Furthermore, the authorities failed to implement the law in practice: effective investigation and punishment for the perpetrator was lacking. E.A.’s complaint contained credible (anal) rape and other SV allegations, which were not investigated despite their particular gravity. (§§153-4) The investigation took insufficient account of the control exercised by the abuser and the severe impact on E.A.’s health. It was crucial to assess whether such circumstances allowed free consent. (§§156-9) The courts refused to consider rape and SV charges as no ‘violence, constraint, threat, or surprise’ was proven, in their view. Despite acknowledging E.A.’s fragility and her aggressor’s abuse of professional status, his professional threats, and his aggressive humiliation of her in professional situations, which had all eroded E.A.’s health and caused her to submit to him, they did not draw any conclusions from that context regarding her ‘consent’. (§161)

The facts had to be assessed in their professional context. (§165) The abuser exercised functional authority over E.A., his post giving him real power over her. E.A. was a young professional whose employment status depended on her success in a competition, which her abuser had threatened to intervene in. He was vindictive towards her and used his status to discredit and isolate her professionally. (§165)   
 
Moreover, the sexual acts had a context of repeated psychological violence, including increasing humiliation. The abuser exercised growing surveillance over E.A.’s daily life and deliberately used emotional ambivalence towards her. Importantly, the ECtHR characterised this as coercive control, defining it as an entirety of behaviours typical of relationships marked by domination in which one individual aims to persistently control their partner and their partner’s life affecting their psychological integrity and personal autonomy. (§166) The Court relied on GREVIO reports discussing such control in intimate partner violence contexts. It noted that coercive control is likely to render the victim particularly vulnerable, affecting their judgment. An authority had found that the abuser had ‘extremely significant hold’ over E.A. (§166) However, the courts had failed to take into account her professional vulnerability and the major deterioration of her mental health, causing her psychiatric hospitalisation for many months. (§167-8)   
 
Importantly, the Court concluded that the manner in which the courts had imputed consent to E.A. based on the ‘master-bitch contract’ amounted to her secondary victimisation. (§170) It stressed that no manner of past agreement, including a written contract, is capable of amounting to consent, consent being by nature revocable. The courts should have completely ignored the ‘contract’ between E.A. and her abuser. (§169)    
 
Indeed, the Court held, the ‘master-bitch contract’ which the abuser made E.A. sign was one of the instruments of his coercive control. By holding her signature against her, the courts had exposed E.A. to secondary victimisation. Such reasoning was guilt-inducing, stigmatising, and liable to dissuade SV victims from enforcing their rights. The authorities had failed their duty to protect E.A.’s dignity. (§170)    
 
In conclusion, the gaps in the domestic legislation and the deficiencies in its implementation - among others, excluding SV from the investigation and misinterpreting E.A.’s consent - amounted to a failure of the state to meet its positive duties to address sexual violence in violation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. (§171)    
 
Commentary
 
E.A. is a future-relevant precedent. The ECtHR has significantly developed rape and sexual harassment law under the ECHR by setting out illustrative conditions in which free, informed consent should be found lacking. It has integrated the notion of coercive control in sexual relationships as an important aspect of the requisite contextual analysis when assessing consent. Now explicitly under ECHR law, a coercive control context exacerbates a victim’s vulnerability affecting her ability to freely consent. Furthermore, the Court has built on its acknowledgment that only present consent is consent, now also outside of marriage contexts.

(See H.W. v. France (2025) for the first holding that only present consent is relevant: contrary to what the Govt had asserted before the Court (!), consent to marriage could not imply consent to future sex; enforcing ‘marital duties’ went against the duty to combat sexual violence, including marital rape (§91).)

E.A. is a landmark, recognising that, for judges to use past consent, especially in a coercive control context, in order to construct consent to a sexual act is revictimisation, blaming survivors and discouraging them from reporting SV. The Court has explicitly grounded the duty to refrain from such victim stigmatisation in respect for victims’ dignity, using dignity-based analysis to uphold victims’ rights.

E.A. is only the third case of SV impunity, after L. v. France and J.L. v. Italy, in which the Court has recognised judicial victim-shaming and blaming (‘guilt-inducing and stigmatising’ reasons) as revictimisation and a breach of the ECHR per se. In two other cases, respectively, workplace sexual harassment and online violence by a former partner (revenge porn), the Court recognised negative gender stereotyping as stigmatising and revictimising, however, in a limited manner and not as a separate breach (M.Ș.D. v. Romania, §147-8, see commentary; C v. Romania, §83-5, see commentary).

E.A. is a solid advancement compared to all these cases, as the Court found revictimisation based on mere imputation of consent, with no additional misogynist language, while in the earlier cases there had been offensive stereotyping and sexist insults/ humiliating remarks as well. 

On the other hand, unlike L. v. France, but like earlier cases of judicial victim-blaming of SV survivors, in which the Court, despite finding revictimisation, simply refused to address discrimination complaints (commentary on this), E.A. ignores gender inequality as the root cause of such revictimisation. E.A. made no discrimination allegation, possibly influenced by the Court’s tendency to dismiss such allegations as ‘unnecessary’ (M.Ș.D. v. Romania, J.L. v. Italy) or as requiring evidence for Article 14 to even apply (C v. Romania). However, under international law, sexual harassment/ violence is unquestionably gendered. Under the Istanbul Convention (IC), sexual harassment is a form of violence against women (VAW). 

Equally, under EU law, including the VAW Directive, criminal sexual harassment is a form of VAW. Under the gender equality directives (2006/54/EC, 2010/41/EU), sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination. Under the Victims’ Directive, sexual harassment is a form of GBV.     
 
Under ILO Convention 190, sexual harassment is included in GBV and gender-based harassment. Under CEDAW, sexual harassment is a form of GBV affecting women. GBV is rooted in men’s entitlement and privilege over women, social norms regarding the need to assert male control or power, enforce gender roles or prevent or punish what is considered to be unacceptable female behaviour. Those factors also contribute to the explicit or implicit social acceptance of GBV and the widespread impunity (General recommendation No. 35).
 
The application of preconceived and stereotypical notions of what constitutes GBV, what women’s responses to such violence should be, and the standard of proof required to substantiate its occurrence affect women’s rights to equality before the law, a fair trial and effective remedy. ‘Often judges adopt rigid standards about what they consider to be appropriate behavior for women and penalize those who do not conform to these stereotypes.’ (CEDAW 2015)
 
In E.A., the Court consistently relied on the IC and GREVIO materials, but failed to acknowledge the gendered nature of E.A.’s victimisation by her abuser and to scrutinise her judicial revictimisation for gender bias. Indeed, regarding victims’ rights in principle, the Court reaffirmed that ‘it is essential for [judges] to avoid reproducing sexist stereotypes in decisions, to downplay [GBV], and to expose women to secondary victimisation by using guilt-inducing language’. (§138) [emphasis added] At the same time, in its reasoning regarding E.A.’s specific case, it never once mentioned that she was victimised as a woman enduring GBV and then, revictimised as a woman by sexist stereotyping.

E.A. is one of a total of four workplace sexual harassment cases decided by the Court: Allée c. France (2024); Vučković v. Croatia (2023); and C. v. Romania (2022) analysed here. In none of those cases did the Court engage with the underlying issue of gender discrimination. In this regard, E.A. is another missed opportunity for the Court to acknowledge that sexual harassment being inherently gendered and thus, discriminatory, , any failure to properly address it, especially at the level of legislation and judicial decisions denying victimhood/ blaming victims, should be scrutinised as likely being discriminatory too. However, in C. v. Romania (2022), the Court refused to apply Article 14, implying that the applicant in such a case has a burden of proof for sheer applicability. C. failed to meet that, not providing ‘any material to allow the Court to assess the existence of potential discrimination’ (§90). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the applicants following her in Vučković, Allée, and E.A. did not raise Article 14 allegations, although they all faced their abusers’ impunity, and one of the victims, Allée, was in fact punished instead of him, for exposing him.
 
The Court has often held it unnecessary to respond to discrimination claims (see critique). On the other hand, as master of the characterisation of the facts – a power it frequently relies on – it has never, not once, considered it necessary to engage with underlying (gender) (in)equality where the applicants silenced themselves on that issue. 
 
I argue that the Court discourages discrimination claims, which may have contributed to E.A.'s not making such a claim. The Court routinely edits applicants' claims, applying articles it prefers, discarding some of the ones they raised, especially A14. It should be able and willing to do the reverse as well - apply an article the applicant omitted if the facts warrant it, especially Article 14 in a GBV case, in which the courts revictimised the woman. In E.A., at the very least, it could and should have integrated a discrimination analysis under Articles 8 and/or 3, as it has done in other cases. 

Next, the Court did not qualify E.A.’s revictimisation as a breach of a negative State duty (to refrain from wrongdoing). It only found positive duties (to act protectively) were breached. (§171) This omission typifies the Court’s approach to judicial stigmatisation of SV/ GBV victims (L. v. France, J.L. v. Italy, M.Ș.D. v. Romania, C v. Romania). The Court stops short of condemning the domestic judges for what they did, framing it instead as something they let happen: they ‘exposed’ the victim to revictimisation rather than committed her revictimisation themselves (see critique).

The Court has recognised domestic judicial leniency as barring access to justice in SV cases, dissuading victims from reporting pervasive abuse (Vučković v. Croatia). However, it may not have examined its own arguable lack of strictness with judges blaming victims in such cases, shielding them from being named as gender-biased, active perpetrators of discriminatory harm. The consequences of its leniency in this regard may be seen as similar: in E.A, and other cases of impunity for SV, the revictimised women did not allege discrimination, their possible Article 14 claims possibly discouraged by ECHR case law.

The Court should help women articulate their inequality, not silence them by creating expectations that they would be dismissed if they attempt to enforce their equality rights on a par with other Convention rights, that their voices would be mute if they named male privilege.      

New Session of the MOOC on ECHR

This week a new session of Utrecht University's free Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) on the ECHR started! It is still possible to enroll. To enroll, please go to the Coursera platform. 

The MOOC entitled 'Human Rights for Open Societies - An introduction into the ECHR' is taught by my Utrecht University colleagues professor Antoine Buyse and professor Janneke Gerards. This is the description of our six-week course:

'Human rights are under pressure in many places across the globe. Peaceful protests are violently quashed. Voting is tampered with. And minorities are often excluded from decision-making. All of this threatens the ideal of an open society in which each of us can be free and participate equally. A solid protection of human rights is needed for an open society to exist and to flourish. But it is often an uphill battle to work towards that ideal. Equip yourself and learn more about what human rights are and how they work. 

In this course, we will introduce you to one of the world’s most intricate human rights systems: the European Convention on Human Rights. You will see when and how people can turn to the European Court of Human Rights to complain about human rights violations. You will learn how the Court tries to solve many of the difficult human rights dilemmas of today. We will look, amongst other things, at the freedom of expression and demonstration, the right to vote, and the prohibition of discrimination. And we will address the rights of migrants, refugees, and other vulnerable groups. And, of course, we will see whether it is possible to restrict rights and if so under what conditions. You will even encounter watchdogs and ice cream in this course. We invite you to follow us on a journey of discovery into the European Convention!'

Please watch this short introduction video to get an impression:

New Book on Property under the ECHR

Henrik Jorem has published the new book The Development of the Right to Property in the European Convention on Human Rights with Brill. It deals not only with the evolving case-law on Article 1 of Protocol 1, but also places this in wider discussions about subsidiarity and procedural review. The volume is the first in a new series entitled Interdisciplinary Studies into the Council of Europe and its Conventions, edited by Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Michele Nicoletti. This is the abstract of Henrik Jorem's book: 

'The right to the peaceful enjoyment of property is one of the most frequently invoked rights in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It is also one of the most complex and least understood. Through the Convention's history, the protection of the right to property has undergone significant development in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This book shows how the Court’s reliance on the Convention’s object and purpose – in particular the rule of law – has served as the main impetus for development. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the jurisprudence, the book analyses the arguments and clarifies the principles governing human rights protection of property rights.'

New Book on the Regional Human Rights Courts, Including the ECtHR

Ahmed Almutawa (Durham University) and Konstantinos D. Magliveras (University of the Aegean) have just pubslished a new edited book entitled 'A Comparison of the European, Inter-American, African and Arab Human Rights Courts: Institutional Aspects'. The book offers a comparative analysis of the institutional and procedural aspects of the regional human rights courts. It, of course, includes the European Court of Human Rights as one of the courts analyzed. Various scholars from Europe, Africa and the Middle East have contributed to this new book. 

This is the abstract:

'This book focuses on the institutional aspects of the European, Inter-American, African and Arab Human Rights Courts. It emphasizes a comparative analysis of the legal and procedural aspects of the three currently active courts, the European, Inter-American, and African Human Rights Courts, while also considering the Arab Court of Human Rights, which has not yet become operational. By examining the procedural elements of all regional human rights courts from a comparative point of view, this edited collection fills a gap in the existing literature. 

This book contains eleven chapters by different authors, each addressing a particular procedural or institutional issue related to regional human rights courts. The diverse authorship, drawn from Europe, Africa and the Middle East, ensures a range of different perspectives that combine an interesting and sustained comparative analysis of the operation of the regional human rights courts. The chapters examine the institutional and procedural aspects concerning the judges, the courts' jurisdiction, the sources of applicable law, the access to the court and admissibility, the processes of hearing a case, interim measures, advisory opinions, judgments and reparation, and the supervision and enforcement of judgments. These substantive chapters are supported by an introduction that provides a historical context for each human rights court within its respective system, and a concluding chapter that critically examines the past, present and future of regional human rights protection and justice.

The aim of this book is to provide a valuable resource for both academic researchers and human rights practitioners. It should also be useful for undergraduate and postgraduate students studying human rights.'

Launch of ECHR AGORA

We reported on the online event on the ECHR and the Age of Backlash earlier this week here. That event will also serve as the launch of the new European platform AGORA, initiated by Andrew Forde and supported by this blog's editors among many others. Please find his guest post below on the ideas behind this initiative and join him and the speakers on 30 October online.

Building a New AGORA: A Pan-European Platform for Evidence-Based Human Rights Debate

Andrew Forde, Dublin City University

In ancient Greece, an agora was a place where democracy was practiced, laws were debated, and citizens could speak freely about issues affecting them. In the haze of social media, the noise of political sound bites and the speed of modern news cycles, it sometimes feels like we are losing the space for rational, honest and evidence-based discussion on important issues affecting our lives, such as our human rights. Or perhaps we’re losing perspective as to why rights even matter in our advanced economies and mature democracies? 

Despite the horrors of Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, most Europeans (thankfully) don’t have lived-experience of repression, war or authoritarian systems, so it’s objectively hard to imagine a world where our rights would be restricted, our judicial systems unfair, or our freedom of speech curtailed. In truth, for the overwhelming majority of people, human rights don’t really matter to them precisely because they are so essential, embedded and effective. 

But liberty fuels complacency. If we then allow human rights, democracy and rule of law protections to be eroded, all of society suffers and there’s no quick way to reverse damage done by policy choices which are based on false narratives, misinformation or motivated by short-term political interests. 

Political posturing versus ideological rupture

Recently there has been sharper push-back against the European human rights system than usual, in particular in discussions relating to migration. In several countries, the European Court of Human Rights is being accused of mission creep, whilst others claim it limits sovereignty. 

Backlash is not unusual, in fact it is a quite normal feature of the business of human rights and the work of the Council of Europe (CoE). The European human rights system is collegiate but principled, and this gives rise to tension at times even if it goes to lengths to stress the subsidiarity principle and doctrine of margin of appreciation. Much like riding a bike, there can no real progress without some friction. 

Despite this, recent months have been qualitatively different with some states suggesting a pick-and-choose approach to standards, whilst others have made withdrawal from the ECHR a mainstream idea. Both ideas seem politically seductive, but lack a persuasive legal, normative or public-opinion basis. States are entitled to discuss the systems they are custodians of, just like the Courts are entitled to be judicially independent of governments, a fundamental principle of the separation of powers. However, things seem to be getting murky. States are openly pressurising the Court to adopt ever-more conservative approaches, whilst avoiding a robust, evidence-based discussion about their core concerns and the actual facts. Is this political posturing, or is it indicative of a broader ideological rupture with the basic values underpinning the CoE? 

Whatever the diagnosis, what’s clear is that a new and open-minded conversation about the ECHR is urgently required, and we should actively encourage it. Only through discussion, can we remind ourselves of the fundamental importance of these standards to us all and foster renewal. 

AGORA Group Launch

This is part of the reason why the new AGORA Group was established as an independent, pan-European platform committed to open dialogue and balanced, evidence-based debate on key issues concerning the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Hundreds of academics and practitioners have signed up so far, representing all 46 member states, and this number is growing by the day.

Join us on 30 October for our first AGORA Group online symposium on 'The Age of Backlash – The European Convention on Human Rights and the new Political Reality'. The event will also mark the official launch of the new AGORA Group. Everyone interested in a fit-for-purpose European human rights system is most welcome to join.

New Book on Child Protection and the ECHR

Hege Stein Helland, Marit Skivenes and Siri Gloppen of the University of Bergen have just published a new edited book entitled 'Child Protection and the European Court of Human Rights: Lessons from Norway in the Development and Contestation of Children's Rights'. The book analyses judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in child protection cases in order to examine how the Court shapes child protection litigation and mobilisation, with a specific focus on Norway. Here is the abstract:

'Article 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights gives children the same protection of their fundamental rights and freedoms as adults. However, there is a notable absence of specific provisions for their rights. What does this imply in practice?

This interdisciplinary volume brings together leading scholars in political science, law, social work and more to examine how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) shapes – and is shaped by – child protection litigation and mobilisation.

Norway has had more child protection cases decided by the ECtHR than any other country, and so this book, a first of its kind, uses Norway as a specific focus and explores the evolving role of the Court in balancing parental rights, state authority and children’s best interests, offering a fresh perspective on the intersection of international human rights law, children’s rights and child protection policy.'

The book is available open access here. 

Online Event 'The Age of Backlash: the ECHR and the New Political Reality'

On 30 October from 13:00-14:30 CET, the Dublin European Law Institute (DELI) of the Dublin City University (DCI) is organizing an online event entitled 'The Age of Backlash: the European Convention on Human Rights and the New Political Reality'. This event will explore the political pressure and challenges the system of the European Convention on Human Rights is facing. Speakers will include Senator Adam Bodnar (former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of the Republic of Poland), Andrew Forde (Dublin City University), Mikael Madsen (University of Copenhagen), Alice Donald (Middlesex University), Colin Harvey (Queen's University Belfast) and Veronika Fikfak (University College London/University of Copenhagen). This event will also mark the launch of the AGORA Group, a new pan-European platform dedicated to an open, evidence-based dialogue on issues concerning the ECHR.

Here is a description of the event:

'Despite the unity around values expressed by Council of Europe member states at the 2023 Reykjavík Summit - following Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe a year earlier for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine - the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has come under sustained political pressure. It has been accused of judicial overreach, normative arrogance, and even blamed for domestic policy failings.

Backlash against the Convention system is not new, but recent developments appear to be qualitatively different. A group of nine states recently issued a wide-ranging open letter calling for the Court to afford greater latitude to national authorities in the field of migration, particularly in cases concerning the expulsion of “criminal foreign nationals.” Concrete proposals to reform the ECHR are now in motion. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, leaving the ECHR has become a mainstream policy position of two major parties—with apparently little concern for its implications, especially in Northern Ireland, where the Good Friday Agreement hinges on the Convention.

Are these positions and criticisms reasonable and legitimate, or is there a growing political tendency to scapegoat the ECHR? What trends can be observed, and how should the system engage or respond? These questions will be explored by a panel of leading experts.

This event will also mark the official launch of the AGORA Group, an independent, pan-European platform committed to open dialogue and balanced, evidence-based debate on key issues concerning the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which now brings together more than 500 members.'

You can register here for the online event.

Webinar on the Role of the CoE in Armed Conflicts

On 24 October 2025 from 12:00-13:30 CET, the Campaign to Uphold Rights in Europe (CURE) is organizing a webinar entitled 'Work on Conflicts: Is There a Space for the Council of Europe?'. The webinar will explore the question of what role the political organs of the Council of Europe can play in the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts between the CoE member states, such as the conflicts in Georgia, Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh. The webinar will draw on a recently published article on this question written by Anca Ailincai (University of Grenoble-Alpes). Various experts will provide their reflections on the topic, including Andrew Forde (Dublin City University), Christos Giakoumopoulos (former Director General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the CoE from 2017 to 2024) and Ucha Nanuashvili (Vice President of the International Federation for Human Rights). The event will be moderated by Ioulietta Bisiouli (Director of the European Implementation Network). 

Here is a description of the webinar:

'The Council of Europe, though not a security organisation, has a role to play in armed conflicts between its member states. Cases arising from conflicts in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine may reach the European Court of Human Rights, but long delays and obstacles to the enforcement of judgements cast doubt on the Court’s capacity to act as the sole provider of timely and effective remedies.

In a recent article in the Revue générale de droit international public (see: https://lnkd.in/dreiWgb9), Professor Anca Ailincai examines the legal basis for the Council’s political organs to play a more active role in conflict prevention and peaceful settlement.

• Should the Council of Europe continue to rely on its judicial body, the European Court, or can it develop a more holistic response to conflict prevention and resolution?

• How can the Council overcome the ambiguities in its mandate to include the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers in work on conflicts?

• Is creating a new intergovernmental forum for geopolitical and strategic discussions, such as the European Political Community, more effective than improving what already exists?

Join the webinar to discuss these and other related questions with the author of the article and other leading experts on the issues related to the work of the CoE and conflicts.'

Registrations are open until 20 October. You can register here for the webinar. 

Conference on ECHR and Venice Commission: Guarding Human Rights and the Rule of Law, and Facilitating Constitutional Resilience

On 6 and 7 November 2025, Katja Ziegler, Ed Bates, Amal Sethi (CELI - Centre for European Law and Internationalisation) and Julinda Beqiraj (Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law) are organising an event on the ‘ECHR and Venice Commission: Guarding Human Rights and the Rule of Law, and Facilitating Constitutional Resilience’. The event will take place at the BIICL (British Institute of International and Comparative Law) in London.

 

The event, organised by CELI in cooperation with the Bingham Centre, will coincide with two anniversaries: the 75th anniversary of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 35th anniversary of the Venice Commission.

 

Day One (6 November) will feature invited speakers, including current and former judges of the European Court of Human Rights, reflecting on the impact of the ECHR and the Venice Commission in the UK and Europe, including on the UK's constitutional framework and the UK's role in European human rights protection, and how a multi-layered protection of human rights may contribute to overall constitutional resilience. (Registration here – draft programme, here).

Day Two (7 November) will adopt an academic format featuring thematic panels and research presentations, expanding the discussion through comparative perspectives on constitutional resilience and multi-layered rights protection. Abstract submissions  that engage with the theme of constitutional resilience in the context of multi-layered human rights protection were collected for this day of the conference through a call for papers. (Registration here – draft programme, here).

 

Registration is now open to attend either or both days.