
An informal
ministerial conference took place in Strasbourg on human rights day, 10 December
2025. As is explained in more detail below, this exceptional gathering was
prompted by a letter of
nine ECHR states of about seven months earlier. The ministerial conference
resulted in the adoption of conclusions, which
invited the Committee of Ministers, among other things, to prepare a ‘draft
political declaration’ on the Convention and migration. Before discussing the
statements delivered at the conference and the conclusions in more detail, this
blog summarises the aforementioned letter and the reactions to it, as well as previous
ministerial conferences and their results.
The letter of nine
On 22 May 2025,
nine ECHR (and EU) states published a letter,
addressed to no one in particular, aiming to ‘launch a new and open minded
conversation about the interpretation’ of the ECHR in order to ‘restore the
right balance’. More specifically, they believe, among other things, that there
should be ‘more room nationally to decide on when to expel criminal foreign
nationals’. They also believe that they ‘need to be able to take effective
steps to counter hostile states that are trying to use our values and rights
against us’, including by ‘instrumentalizing migrants at our borders’.
The letter has probably
set in motion more than the signatories expected. Unsurprisingly, many
reactions have appeared in the blogosphere. Setting aside the letter’s content for the moment, Steininger observed
that it ‘is apparent that the letter is not sufficient to account for an actual
attempt at institutional reform (so far)’. Like Steininger, Ní
Chinnéide and Sevrin emphasised that that
this type of backlash or tension is nothing new. Meanwhile, Buyse wrote that,
by choosing to publish an open letter, ‘the governments behind the open letter [are]
putting a new round of pressure on the Court’. Donald
and Forde added that, even
though the letter does not explain ‘what they seek to reform, how and why’,
it is clear that that the states ‘intend to change something’. So, although the
letter is not addressed to the Court, it is clear that the Court is the primary
target audience and that the nine states intend to initiate a change that is
not yet clearly defined.
The AGORA
group – a new ‘pan-European platform committed to open
dialogue, rigorous inquiry, and balanced, evidence-based debate’ on ECHR issues
– published an open letter on behalf of around 150 legal academics and
advocates. The letter emphasised the need to discuss the ECHR system ‘in a
manner that is consistent with the’ CoE values and standards, ‘in particular
the rule of law and democratic governance’. The letter echoes the statement of
ENNHRI, the European
Network of National Human Rights Institutions. The
AGORA group also recalled that, in the Reykjavík
Declaration of May 2023, the CoE member states had reaffirmed
their ‘unwavering commitment to the Convention system as a mechanism to promote
peace and stability in Europe and the [CoE’s] core values of human rights,
democracy and the rule of law’.
The letter did not
go unnoticed among ECHR states parties either. To take one example, the office
of the Belgian Prime Minister De
Wever, who was one of the signatories of the letter, asked
Bossuyt to write a paper addressing the concerns expressed in the letter. Bossuyt
is a former president of the Belgian Constitutional Court. The idea was to
‘quietly circulate the confidential paper among European leaders’. In line with
the paper’s recommendations, De
Wever proposed not amending
the Convention, as this would take too long. Instead, he would like to add a
further undefined ‘interpretation protocol’ to the ECHR. As Donald explained, ‘it is not clear whether De Wever does in
fact mean a protocol to the ECHR or, more likely, an interpretive declaration’.
To take another
example, the Dutch parliament responded to the country’s decision not to sign the letter by
passing a motion calling on the Dutch government to explore the
possibility of modernising or revising treaties such as the ECHR. The Dutch parliament
also adopted a motion in
support of De Wever’s idea after he delivered a speech at the
HJ Schoo Lecture, which marks the unofficial start of the Dutch political year.
In this speech, he also addressed the issue of migration and the ECHR. In line
with the second motion, the Dutch government’s position during
the informal ministerial conference was that the participants should instruct
the Committee of Ministers to adopt a political declaration at the ordinary
ministerial conference in May 2026. This declaration should have the status of
an ‘interpretative declaration’ (rather than a ‘protocol’, as De Wever suggested),
thus providing further guidance on the interpretation of the ECHR in the context
of asylum and immigration policy. Interpretative declarations are a known
phenomenon in international
law.
The Court has firmly stated that it has the authority to
determine the validity under Article 57 ECHR (Article 64 at the time) of ‘a
reservation or, where appropriate, of an interpretative declaration’.
Council of Europe
reactions
Within the CoE, the
Court responded to the letter by introducing some evidence to the debate in the
form of a factsheet about immigration. The factsheet shows that only 1.5% of
the cases pending before the Court relate to immigration. Furthermore, the Court
identified violations in approximately 6% of the immigration-related
applications over the past ten years. The CoE Commissioner
for Human Rights wrote that the
letter contains ‘so much to repudiate and challenge’ and that it ‘posits
evidence free claims’, which underlines the importance of the Court’s factsheet.
The CoE Secretary
General Berset explained
that ‘[d]ebate is healthy, but politicizing the Court is not’. He also emphasised
that ‘[u]pholding the independence and impartiality of the Court is our
bedrock’. In addition to outlining four ‘basic factual premises’ for measures to address
the concerns ‘of some European political leaders regarding the issue of
migration’ and the Convention, Berset proposed four avenues to address these
concerns. I will return to one of them when discussing the conclusions. It is Berset
who initiated the
informal ministerial conference with the aim of re-establishing discussions within
the CoE framework. As Donald
and Forde explained, ‘the advantages of utilising established
fora as opposed to informal back-channels to discuss fundamental structural or
normative issues is that discussions are more structured, comprehensive and
transparent, and the involvement of expertise ensures that any course of action
taken is based on facts and consideration of potential consequences’. The
conference also ensures that all 46 Convention states participate in the
discussion, rather than just 9 EU states.
The statements
delivered at the informal ministerial conference
At the conference
on 10 December 2025, 27 states delivered a joint
statement. 19 of these states are EU states.[i]
The following EU states were missing: Cyprus,
France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. After
confirming their
‘commitment’ to the Convention (rather than their ‘unwavering commitment’ as in
the Reykjavík
Declaration), the states echoed the letter of the nine
states in many ways, referring to ‘people who take advantage of our hospitality
by committing serious crime’ and the need to protect their own populations.
More specifically, they considered it ‘vital that the balance between
individual rights and legitimate aims as per Article 8 […] is adjusted so that
more weight is put on the nature and seriousness of the offence committed and
less weight is put on the foreign criminal’s’ interests. Comparably, they stated
that the ‘scope of “inhuman and degrading treatment” under Article 3 […] should
be constrained’ in the manner they see fit. Neither a group of states, nor the
Committee of Ministers under the Convention or the CoE Statue has the
competence to interpret the Convention; this competence lies solely with the
Court (Articles 19 and 32(1) ECHR). For this reason alone, the proposed ‘rebalancing’
under Article 8 and limiting the scope of Article 3 are highly problematic. Therefore,
these states ‘support’ for the Court’s independence is merely paying lip
service to this key concept.
The CoE
Commissioner for Human Rights’ statement is of
a wholly different nature and highlights further reasons why the joint
statement is problematic. In his brief statement, O’Flaherty raised some very
pertinent issues. First, he emphasised the importance of ‘impeccable facts’
and, in this context, described the claim that the so-called instrumentalisation
of migration undermines national security’ as ‘unconvincing’, while also
challenging the assumption that adjusting the Court’s practice will ‘impact
irregular migration flows’. He also urged the states not to ‘throw the law in
question’ – specifically, the universality of human rights, the absolute prohibition
of refoulement, and the Court’s independence. O’Flaherty was ‘convinced
that our peoples are not against strong human rights protections for everyone’.
Although Secretary
General Berset’s statement is less critical, he mentioned that the
letter does not reflect his views. He underscored the importance of political dialogue
and the evolving nature and significance of the Convention. While describing migration
as having a ‘human face’, he also outlined the ‘challenges of irregular
migration’, including its instrumentalisation.
Conference conclusions
The first few preambular
paragraphs of the conclusions are rather general, referring to the ‘need to preserve
the integrity of the Convention system’, the ‘the unconditional obligation on
States to abide by the final judgments of the Court’ and the ‘subsidiary
nature’ of the Convention system, for example. The final preambular paragraphs address
the ‘migration challenges’ that supposedly prompted the debate initiated by the
letter of nine. According to the conclusions, these challenges include the ‘instrumentalisation
of migration, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and other
criminal activities in this context’. A category of ‘challenges’ that is
highlighted separately is ‘related to the expulsion and return of foreigners
convicted of serious offences, while respecting human rights’. Additionally,
the participants at the conference acknowledge a wide range of issues that appear
to be the result of a complex compromise: ‘the fundamental responsibility of
governments to ensure national security, public safety and the economic
well-being of the country, as well as their sovereign right to protect their
borders, whilst respecting without discrimination the core values of human
rights, democracy and the rule of law, and conscious of the financial
challenges encountered by multilateral co-operation on migration issues’.
The operative
paragraphs of the conclusions invite the Committee of Ministers to:
‘a) prepare
a draft political declaration reaffirming the obligation to ensure the
effective enjoyment of the [Convention] rights […] to everyone within the
jurisdiction of member States in the context of the contemporary challenges
posed both by irregular migration and by the situation of foreigners convicted
of serious offences, taking duly into account in particular governments’ fundamental
responsibility to ensure national security and public safety;
b) reiterate
its support for the elaboration of a new recommendation on deterring and
fighting the smuggling of migrants, with full respect for their human rights;
c) consider
how the [CoE], including through the possible creation of an inter-governmental
committee, can best address pressing migration issues and related
policies;
d) encourage
the Secretary General to engage in discussions at an international level
relating to migration.’
The first proposal
is clearly the most conspicuous. It is difficult to predict the content of this
political declaration based on the proposal, since the proposal is hard to
decipher and ambiguous. The political declaration should reaffirm the
obligation to protect everyone’s Convention rights in the context of migration
challenges on the one hand. This almost seems to contradict the joint statement,
which proposes reducing the protection afforded by the Convention to ‘address’
migration challenges, and is also not in line with the spirit of the letter. On
the other hand, the addition that the political declaration should duly take
into account governments’ responsibility to ‘ensure national security and
public safety’, is more in line with the joint statement and the letter: the
‘migration challenges’ and the protection of human rights undermine the
governments’ ability to fulfil this responsibility.
The proposal is
less clear and less controversial than Berset’s ‘avenues’, since he proposed not only the adoption of
a ‘declaration on migration and the Convention’, but also that the text of the
declaration ‘clearly indicate how the High Contracting Parties understand the
Convention in migration cases, including in relation to criminal activities’.
This proposal signals more clearly than the conclusions that the states intend
to influence the Court’s interpretation of the Convention.
Apart from its content,
the form of the proposal is notable: a political declaration, rather than the interpretation
protocol that De Wever proposed, although he may actually have meant a political
declaration. Political declarations were adopted at the five high-level
conferences dedicated to the future of the ECtHR, which took place between 2010
and 2018. In these declarations, the states took stock of the reform process,
identified problems concerning the Convention system and proposed reform
measures. I previously found that more than half of these proposals had not
been implemented, primarily due to opposition from the Court. However, the Court
did take a considerable number of measures to enhance its ability to process
cases, it has reduced the number of interim measures granted, and it has placed
greater emphasis on the subsidiarity principle in its case law. Secretary
General Berset also noted
that ‘[r]esearch and empirical evidence show that the Court is not indifferent
to such political declarations and considers them in its judicial work’. Donald
and Forde confirmed that ‘judges
live in the real world, and they pay attention to the perspectives of states’. Therefore,
such a declaration may be a way for the states ‘to inform and perhaps even
“nudge” the Court in a certain direction’. Additionally, Buyse noted
that the debate about the Convention could lead to ‘subtle shifts in case-law’. Unlike the proposal made by the Dutch delegation
at the informal ministerial conference, the declaration is not specified as
having the status of an interpretative declaration.
The timing of the conference
at which the political declaration will be proposed is unclear. It could be
adopted at the ordinary ministerial conference, which is due to take place in
Moldova in May 2026 (the Dutch proposal). However, Berset proposed organising a ‘dedicated’ high-level
conference, probably similar to those held from 2010 to 2018.
My conclusion
Discussions about
the Court in 2026 will continue to focus on migration and the ECHR, and a
political declaration on this topic is expected. If the declaration reflects
the joint statement, it will call on the Court to significantly reduce human rights
protection for (certain categories of migrants). According to some (see
also here), this
process has already begun and it may be reinforced by a political declaration,
since the Court has not been not insensitive to such declarations. Despite the
both legally and empirically questionable basis of their proposals, a significant
proportion of ECHR states parties are determined to follow this course. However,
since a political declaration requires the approval of all 46 states parties, its
content will likely be more nuanced than the joint proposal, as the conclusions
adopted at the information ministerial conference also suggest. Still, dynamics
in the states may lead to states changing their attitude, as demonstrated by
the case of the Netherlands, where the Convention became the subject of parliamentary
debates. Although the Netherlands did not sign the letter from the nine states,
it did participate in the joint declaration, which is likely to have been a consequence
of the debates.
[i] Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden. The non-EU
states are: Albania, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Ukraine,
United Kingdom