Tuesday, 17 March 2026
New Book on EU Fundamental Rights in ECtHR Case-Law
Monday, 16 March 2026
New Podcast Episode 'Lawyering Before the ECtHR'
Tuesday, 10 March 2026
The ECHR’s Procrustean bed: A final call for perspective in the Chișinău process
By Alice Donald and Andrew Forde
In Greek mythology,
Procrustes made visitors fit his bed by either stretching them or cutting off
their legs. Sure, they would “fit” the bed, but at what cost? Applying an
arbitrary approach to a complex problem and ignoring the harm that may result,
Council of Europe governments are building their own Procrustean bed.
Member states will
meet in Chișinău in May to adopt a political declaration on migration and the
European Convention on Human Rights. It marks the first time that states have
embarked on a process that, judging by its origins and conduct, can only
result in a regression in human rights protection for certain (still
ill-defined) categories of migrants and perhaps, in time, for everyone.
The process stems
from an Informal Ministerial Conference on 10 December
2025, where states instructed the Steering Committee for Human
Rights (CDDH) to prepare elements for the political declaration (see the latest
iteration here). Following meetings in January and February, and another on 10-12 March, the CDDH must report back by 22
March so that Ambassadors can finalise the declaration before the Committee of
Ministers (CM) meets on 14-15 May 2026.
Much has been
written about the Chișinău process and the letter of nine of May 2025 and Joint Statement of 27 states issued in
December, which effectively set its agenda; see our submission
to the CDDH, analyses of the process (Acconciamessa, Donald and Forde, Glas, Krommendijk and
Möller)
and commentaries focusing on the risk of weakening Article 3 in expulsion cases
(Fikfak, Mavronicola).
Here, we argue that
the process has not escaped its problematic origins in the politicised sniping
at the Court from various capitals. It has been rushed and exclusionary, and
brings greater risks than benefits for a system already under pressure. The result
has been a narrative driven by certain states without a clear evidential basis,
with many silent states yet to reveal their hand publicly. We urge member
states to use the remaining weeks to build on points of progress and minimise
the scope for unintended consequences, transforming the Chișinău Declaration
into something constructive for the Convention system and states alike.
Comparison with
Interlaken
The Chișinău
process compares unfavourably with the Interlaken process from 2010-2020. Interlaken
had a clear and constructive purpose – “reinforcing the
effectiveness and sustainability of the Convention system”. While its impact
was mixed, and some states used it as a venue to challenge the authority of the European Court of Human
Rights, it had a solid evidential basis: the unsustainable caseload
in Strasbourg caused by states’ failure to fully implement the Convention and the Court’s
judgments.
The Interlaken process also allowed for
participation by civil society and national human rights institutions (NHRIs), including
through the CDDH and its subcommittees. High-level
conferences stressed the
importance of external consultation, which in turn influenced the declarations,
notably Brighton in 2012 and Copenhagen in 2018.
A rushed and
politicised process
By contrast, the
Chișinău process is unusually compressed. In October 2025, the Secretary
General proposed
a high-level conference and the adoption of a declaration in 2026, but this did
not bind states to a May deadline, which was set by Ministers at the 10
December meeting amid growing political pressure from some states. The timetable – less than six months from start
to finish – was unduly short to consider such consequential issues and
has made it difficult for external stakeholders to contribute (although we
acknowledge, and appreciate, that our unsolicited submission
was informally circulated to CDDH members). It has also largely precluded
consultation or parliamentary deliberation at national level. The “very short deadline” also led the CDDH to
decide, unusually, that comments submitted by participants and observers would only be
discussed when supported by the delegation of a member state.
Not only is the
Chișinău process less inclusive than Interlaken, but it also has more parochial
aims, reflecting some states’ wish for a freer hand to reduce migration and
speed up expulsions while reducing the scope for legal challenge based on the
ECHR. The process must also be seen in the context of the EU Migration Pact, which enters into force in
June, just a month after the declaration. The Pact already pushes the boundaries of human rights law, and
EU states may be hoping that the Chișinău declaration will serve as a
convenient shield for the measures foreseen nationally and collectively under
the Pact.
The CDDH process
It is welcome that the process has
been brought within the proper channel of the CDDH, which allows for structured,
comprehensive and transparent discussions, with the participation of the other Council of Europe
organs and observers drawn from civil society, academia and NHRIs, supported by
an expert secretariat. Yet, many of these potential
advantages now risk being squandered.
The Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights has proposed four yardsticks for the process: that it should be law-based
rather than driven by political considerations; factual and
evidence-based; firm on the principles of the universality of human rights and the
Court’s independence; and transparent to the public.
We now consider how far these have been – or still could be – achieved.
Law-based or political?
The overtly
political origins of the Chișinău process justify the Commissioner’s concern for the
declaration to be legally watertight.
Some significant revisions have been made
in the CDDH document between its first and second iterations. For example, the latest version
omits an earlier suggestion that, in situations of “mass irregular arrivals”,
states may apply “rules-based decision-making … without
necessarily examining individual circumstances in every case”. This proposal ran
counter to the Council of Europe’s
2009 Guidelines on accelerated asylum procedures and was not supported by the Court’s case
law.
Another welcome revision is the removal of a
statement in the section on “instrumentalisation of migration” that the concept
of “democracy capable of defending itself”, as developed in the Court’s case
law under Article 17 (prohibition of abuse of rights), may be relevant. This
could have been read as suggesting that applicants alleging violations during state pushbacks were complicit in their own
instrumentalisation and attempting to undermine the Convention system – a troubling echo of the Joint Statement of 27 states, which referred, without substantiation, to human rights being
instrumentalised by “hostile regimes and individual applicants with ulterior
motives” (emphasis added).
However, other
questionable passages that evince the blurring of the legal and political
remain. These include ambiguous statements that could be read as seeking to
qualify or relativise states’ obligations, e.g. that in determining the minimum
level of severity for inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Court
should “[avoid] unnecessary constraints on decisions to extradite, or to expel
foreign nationals”. This implies, without reference to case law, that the Court
creates "unnecessary constraints” and, moreover, could be read as an
instruction to the Court in disregard of its interpretive authority under
Article 32.
It is problematic,
too, that the CDDH document retains references to case law from which the Court
has expressly distanced itself. For instance, it cites the 2012 judgment in Babar
Ahmad and Others v UK to the effect that “treatment which might
violate Article 3 because of an act or omission of a Contracting State might
not attain the minimum level of severity which is required for there to be a
violation of Article 3 in an expulsion or extradition case”. This relativist
approach was rejected in 2022 by the Grand Chamber in Sanchez-Sanchez v UK, which stated that
the Court “does not consider
that any distinction can be drawn between the minimum level of severity
required to meet the Article 3 threshold in the domestic context and the
minimum level required in the extra-territorial context”.
It is not only
specific passages but also the framing of the Chișinău process that is questionable, in at least
two respects.
First, while the CDDH text states that
the principle of non-refoulement is codified in other international instruments
(the UN Refugee Convention and Convention Against Torture) and reflective of
customary international law, it fails to sufficiently acknowledge that Convention standards
reflect other norms of treaty and customary international law and are applied
consistently with other standards of international human rights law and refugee
law. This omission matters in national contexts, like the UK, where the ECHR has become the focus of opprobrium
of radical right wing parties and public debate is insufficiently informed
about the range of treaty obligations that states have undertaken and their
mutually reinforcing nature.
Secondly, the process has been
framed as a zero sum trade-off between, on the one hand, human rights
(especially migrants’ rights) and, on the other hand, national security
and public safety. For example, the CDDH document underlines in relation
to Article 8 that “the right balance must be struck between individual rights
and interests and the weighty public interests of defending freedom and
security”. Yet, elsewhere, the text recalls that in matters of national
security, the Court affords national authorities a wide margin of appreciation
and attaches significant weight to their decision making. In sum, the text
appears to acknowledge that the Strasbourg framework is capable, without
amendment or reinterpretation, of being applied by domestic authorities in a
way that gives due respect to the public interest and discretion of national
authorities. Certainly, no case law is adduced to suggest otherwise – unsurprisingly given the
Court's increasingly deferential approach to states in
its case law on migrants’ right to private and
family life.
The framing of
human rights and security as being inherently in tension has been contested in the context of anti-terrorism
measures. Similar scrutiny is warranted in the migration context. The
implication that migration correlates with increased criminality at a societal
level has not been substantiated in the Chișinău process and ignores evidence to the contrary. This framing risks reinforcing
intolerance by scapegoating migrants for public policy challenges not of their
making – and highlights the
need for careful presentation of evidence in making any case for change.
The need for
evidence and guidance
This brings us to
the Commissioner’s plea for clarity about the nature and scale of migration-related
issues facing states.
The CDDH text
reveals the potential to misrepresent data. For example, it states that “a
significant reduction in irregular maritime crossings may result in a reduction
in the loss of lives at sea”. Data relating to Mediterranean routes show no
correlation between the number of crossings and the numbers who died or are missing; for example,
when arrivals peaked at more than one million in 2015, there were 4,055 losses,
while in 2016, when some 364,000 people crossed the Mediterranean, there were
5,136. Data analysis would reveal why death rates are variable,
including changes to states’ search and rescue policies,
use of
excessive force and unlawful killings. The text as it stands is
misleading in its suggestion that blocking maritime crossings would necessarily
save lives.
More broadly, the political declaration
should be accompanied by data and case law analysis that provides a public
evidence base both for the perceived problems and the proposed solutions. There is no uniform
migration experience across European states, but rather a variety of policy
challenges experienced to different degrees by different states. For member
states to arrive at targeted and effective solutions, the necessary starting
point is a triage of the issues they face. This should encompass factors that may impede the efficient
removal of individuals who have no legal right to remain in a state, such as
resource constraints, administrative blockages and problems in cooperation with
receiving states.
If, in addition, governments consider
that domestic decision makers are not keeping pace with the Court’s case law,
they have the opportunity – indeed responsibility – to
correct them, whether through guidance, legislation or a more active domestic
litigation strategy, as the UK Attorney General has advocated. Further, if as the CDDH text
states, member states need "further guidance” from the Court on questions
of interpretation, they may seek an Advisory Opinion from the
Court under Protocol No. 16 or engage in dialogue with other Convention actors,
which would serve to reinforce the principle of subsidiarity – properly
conceived – and avoid fundamentally compromising the system.
Firm on core
principles
On the question of
universality, the Commissioner has ventured that, “Any discourse that suggests a hierarchy of rights holders on
the basis of their being more or less deserving is deeply problematic”. By
design, or by consequence, if certain groups of rights-holders are singled out
and states make it clear how they want the Court to go in its reasoning, we are
moving towards a managed retreat from the very idea
of universal human rights protection.
Another key concern
is respect for the interpretive authority of the Court under Article 32,
especially in the section of the CDDH text on “instrumentalisation” of
migration. It includes a definition of instrumentalisation which is, without a
citation, adapted from an EU source; states that instrumentalisation
“may raise new legal and factual issues”; and adds that member states “look
forward to receiving guidance from the forthcoming Grand Chamber judgments in
the pending cases”. This passage strays uncomfortably close to pressurising the
Court and usurping its interpretive authority: to date, neither the Court nor
the Council of Europe has defined instrumentalisation, and the Court has not
determined whether it raises new legal issues. Pronouncements by member states
on pending cases also appear ill-suited to a
declaration that aspires to longevity.
Transparency
The CM notes in its
2017 Guidelines for civil participation in political decision
making that participation is “at the very heart of the idea of
democracy” to help ensure that public needs are met and democratic pluralism
upheld. Information, it adds, should be “provided in a timely manner allowing
for substantive input while decisions are still reversible” (emphasis
added).
The Chișinău
process falls short of these standards. While publication of the CDDH texts is
welcome, submissions by governments, participants and observers have not been
published due to the “interest in ensuring an
appropriate environment in which to conduct negotiations on these sensitive
issues”. This relative lack of transparency has been exacerbated by the
unreasonably rushed and non-inclusive nature of the process.
Meaningful
engagement serves multiple purposes, including ensuring better quality, more
acceptable, more legally robust and practically implementable outcomes. Civil
society actors are key partners in building the public trust and confidence in
the Convention system to which the CDDH text aspires.
Conclusion
The Chișinău
process is moving into the political negotiation phase where states will hope
to reach unanimity. It
remains to be seen how the CM will manage the process between now and the
Moldova summit, but what does seem clear is that states committed to a
rules-based international order and those “on the fence” still have significant
leverage to make Chișinău a win-win proposition – an honest acknowledgement of
challenges and a tool for progress. But this requires clear-eyed
reflection by member states: they need to examine the veracity and “shelf-life”
of their current positions and reflect on alignment with their longer-term
interests at a time when Europe faces an aggressor to the east, uncertainty to
the west and the risk of international rupture.
Political
engagement with the ECHR system is not only welcome, it is essential. We need
more good faith political engagement, not less. States should maximise their
use of the robust feedback loop in the Council of Europe, raising specific
concerns including within the framework of the CM, the network of superior
courts and the Parliamentary Assembly.
And what of
Procrustes? He was ultimately undone by Theseus, champion of Athenian
democracy. Theseus used no weapon, he simply applied Procrustes' own arbitrary
standard to the giant himself – finishing him on his own bed. If member states
weaken the European human rights system to solve today’s migration challenges,
they may find that the same approach of diminishing protections and expanding
state powers will, one day, be used to target the very democratic freedoms they
currently seek to defend.
Thursday, 5 March 2026
New ECHR Readings
Monday, 2 March 2026
New Book on Legal Mobilization of Workers before the ECtHR
Workers' Legal Mobilization at the European Court of Human Rights
Friday, 13 February 2026
The Court's Annual Report and Opening of the Judicial Year
At the formal opening, the President of the Court, Mattias Guyomar, in his speech called for judicial unity and solidarity in the face of changing realities in the world. He called on judges of superior courts in the Convention's state parties, saying about the ECHR: "We are all ‘Convention judges’, having this legal embodiment of humanism, in our hands."
The President also mentioned a number of statistics, which are to be found in greater detail in the Annual Report 2025 of the Court: the number of pending cases decreased by 11% in the past year to around 53,450 currently, even n the face of the influx of 31,000 new applications. The Court's docket, although still very large, is through the efforts of the registry now at its lowest point in two decades. Notable, the average time of dealing Wirth impact cases has decreased from a staggering 68 months to 28 months now and the Court aims to bring this back to 1,5 year (18 months) eventually. The President also emphasised: "The European Court is both a whistleblower and a guardian of democracy and the rule of law at the European level. The Convention is our common good and applying it every day is our shared responsibility." Al the more important of course, in the context of the ongoing political debates around the Court and the Convention.
As every year, the official opening was accompanied by a judicial seminar. This time the topic was 'Defending media pluralism and the democratic process in challenging times.' Four aspects were discussed more in detail: “Media pluralism and the right to information,” “Freedom of information and the competences of the European Union: the case of restrictive measures,” “The integrity of the democratic process and judicial control,” and “The free expression of the people’s will as a prerequisite for the protection of a democratic state order.” The background paper to the seminar, which discusses the Court's case-law on these issues can be found here. The President of the Court also spoke here.
Friday, 6 February 2026
New Book on the ECtHR and Authoritarian Populism
Thursday, 5 February 2026
‘We Make It, You Take It’: Fake Dialogue and Genuine Pressure between the States and the European Court of Human Rights
The Dialogue
The Steering Committee for Human
Rights (CDDH) has just published a Preliminary Draft Text for the
Outcome Document Containing Elements for a Political Declaration. Most of this document
is dedicated to the issues of migration, something that occupies the minds and
hearts of the member states. I am sure that this part of the report and
subsequent declaration will attract a lot of academic attention. The commentary by
Natasa Mavronicola on Article 3 ECHR already engages with
some of the core issues. I will look at another part of this document, namely
the dialogue between the states and the European Court of
Human Rights (the Court or the ECtHR) which is included in its final section.
Before I consider this part of the
document, I need to make an introductory remark. The context in which the formal
session of the Committee of Ministers in Chisinau is going to happen should not
be ignored: the states are trying to influence the Court and to reduce its
impact on human rights protection in Europe. Looking at how the recent discussions
around the ‘reform’ of the Court and Convention have taken place, it is perhaps
the notion of pressure that more precisely captures the current iterative and asymmetric
nature of interaction and intentions
between the Court and the states. This means that even those ideas that could
have been seen positively in other circumstances have to be treated with
caution now. With this principle in mind, I will review what this less
controversial part of the draft document has to offer.
This section of the draft document
discusses ‘dialogue’, which, in my view, does not capture the fact that this
exchange is taking place between vastly different actors with significantly
different procedural and political roles. I explored this exchange in the
context of feedback loops previously and argued
that giving the opportunity to the states to voice their concerns is a positive
thing which can prevent exit from the organisation. That said, a particularly
delicate balance must be maintained between the legitimate articulation of issues
and the exertion of pressure on the Court. While the former may be both
appropriate and constructive, the latter is clearly unacceptable. By way of
example, the well-known leaked letter of nine cannot be characterised
as a form of feedback; rather, it constitutes a clear instance of abstract
political pressure on the Court.
Much like I did in my paper, the
CDDH begins this section by presenting what might be described as a “shopping
list” of potential feedback loops. This is one of the challenges that the
drafters of CDDH draft document had to tackle, namely that the Court already
engages extensively in feedback loops with member states. This exchange is done
through visits, regular meetings with higher national courts and other
authorities, through the Superior Courts Network, various formal and informal
routes, before and after certain judgments are adopted. So, the exchange of
feedback between the Court and member states has not been absent. This part of
the draft document mostly elaborate on mechanisms that have already been in
operation for many year but some suggestions are more controversial which practical
operation and implications are not immediately apparent. In this blog, I will
zoom in on three of those proposals that concern third-party interventions,
referrals to the Grand Chamber, and the new so-called forum for dialogue.
Third-Party Interventions
One such practical suggestion
concerned third-party interventions from the states into cases pending before
the Court. This mechanism provides an effective means for interested states to
engage in a direct feedback loop with the Court prior to the delivery of its
judgment. In a separate paper, I examined states’
engagement with this procedural avenue and argued that such interventions are
frequently motivated by self-interest, in particular by a desire to influence
the Court’s approach to issues that may have implications for the intervening state
itself. The Court, in turn, appears well aware of these underlying motivations
and assesses such interventions accordingly.
Through the document the CDDH urges
the Court to ‘facilitate third-party interventions in appropriate cases’. It is
not immediately apparent what is meant by such ‘facilitation’. Interviews
conducted with government agents for the purposes of my research suggest that,
while communication between the Court and national authorities is not always
optimal and information about significant cases may occasionally reach agents
at a late stage, this is not the primary obstacle to more frequent third-party
interventions. Rather, there was broad agreement among interviewees that the
principal impediment lies in resource constraints at the national level. In
most states parties, responsibility for litigation before the Court is
discharged in-house by relatively small teams, which lack the capacity to
prepare third-party interventions in addition to their existing workload as
respondent states. The Chisinau declaration should perhaps encourage the member
states to resource their representatives before the ECtHR better and instruct
them to intervene in sensitive cases.
While third-party interventions by states
may be genuinely helpful in certain cases, they are not an unqualified good,
for at least two reasons. First, such interventions inevitably have the
potential to prolong proceedings, particularly where the Court decides to make
specific procedural arrangements to accommodate them. Given that the Court is
frequently criticised for the length of its proceedings, an increase in
multiple third-party interventions is unlikely to alleviate this concern. One
can however suggest that the Court will be able to absorb a relatively small
increase of such interventions in small number of high profile cases. Second,
third-party interventions carry an inherent risk of exerting pressure on the
Court. Although my research on third-party interventions in Grand Chamber cases
did not reveal any clear link between such interventions and more lenient
judicial outcomes, a systematic increase in the practice would make such
pressure more difficult for the Court to disregard. This concern is
particularly acute in light of the possibility that the forthcoming Chisinau
Declaration may encourage the Court to accord greater weight to such
interventions.
In sum, encouraging state
interventions is not a risk-free idea in the context of increased hostility
towards the Court especially in certain areas. While in some cases, third-party
interventions might enhance the decision-making process, and make the judgments
more holistic and well grounded; if overused they can mount unnecessary
pressure on the Court both in terms of resource implications and more
importantly political considerations.
Referrals to the Grand Chamber
Another suggestion advanced by the
CDDH concerns requests for referral to the Grand Chamber of the Court. One
procedural route by which a case may come before the Court’s most authoritative
formation, composed of seventeen judges, is through referral following the
delivery of a judgment by a Chamber of seven judges. In such circumstances, a
request for referral may be made by one or both of the parties to the
proceedings. The suggested wording is to ‘[r]eiterate the invitation to the
Court to adapt its procedures to make it possible for other States Parties to
indicate their support for the referral of a case to the Grand Chamber when
relevant, which may be useful to draw the attention of the Court to the
existence of a serious issue of general importance’. Perhaps in practice this
would mean that the Court will have to inform member states of all referrals
and ask if they would support any of them. I would expect these statements of
support to be reasoned and explain why a particular state would like to see the
case under consideration in the Grand Chamber. This proposal is akin to the
suggestions concerning third-party interventions discussed in the preceding
subsection, albeit focused on a more specific procedural issue.
It is essential that the Court
retains a high degree of discretion in managing its Grand Chamber docket.
Proceedings before the Grand Chamber are considerably more complex and
time-consuming than those before a Chamber, and the Court has the capacity to
hear no more than approximately 20–25 Grand Chamber cases per year. Reflecting
this structural constraint, the overall success rate of referral requests
remains very low, at around 5 per cent. Should the Court, under increased
pressure, begin to accept a greater number of referrals, there is a real risk
of generating a backlog of cases and further exacerbating the already lengthy
duration of proceedings.
Occasionally, some cases admitted
to the Grand Chamber appear rather unusual, and input from the member states
might be helpful; however, this could potentially come at a cost to the Court’s
legitimacy. The procedure of referrals is not
very transparent. The panel of five judges deciding on referrals normally
offers no reasons for their decision (Rule 73 of the Rules of Court). If many states
support a referral but the panel decides against it without giving any reasons,
this may not appear very dialogical. Furthermore, the Court’s procedure
requires at least the semblance of equality of arms: would such a proposal, for
example, provide an opportunity for NGOs or other stakeholders to comment on
the referrals? Again, taking into account the context of the formal session of
the Committee of Ministers in Chisinau, it is unlikely to be so.
My final point is that a Grand
Chamber judgment should emerge naturally from several feedback loops between
state reactions and Chamber judgments. A premature Grand Chamber judgment risks
entrenching a standard that may be difficult for the member states to accept
and even harder to amend within the Court’s internal architecture.
Forum for Dialogue Among Member States
For me the most unclear suggestion
in the draft document is related to the new forum of the member states on
migration. The document suggests that ‘the Council of Europe may provide a
forum for dialogue among member States to address the challenges relating to
migration, thereby contributing to the coherence, effectiveness and credibility
of the Convention system’. It is hardly a secret that the whole idea of the formal
session of the Committee of Ministers in Chisinau is to deal with migration but
how a forum can contribute to the effectiveness and most of all credibility of
the Convention system is not explained (yet).
There appears to be no apparent
added value in establishing this forum; it is unclear how it would be organised
or what impact it might have on ongoing case law or its implementation.
Considering the broader context in which this reform is taking place, the forum
risks appearing as a lobbying instrument aimed at limiting the Court’s
engagement with ‘migration issues’. Unless further details are provided
regarding its working methods, and, more importantly, its potential impact on
the ECtHR’s case law, its role and impact remain a matter of mistery.
Interim Conclusion
This section of the draft document concludes by encouraging the Court to maintain and strengthen ‘its dialogue, through its judgments and otherwise, with the highest national courts of the States Parties’. While this is a laudable objective, it is also necessary to recall that, pursuant to Article 46 of the Convention, the Court’s judgments are legally binding. Although the Court must retain a degree of flexibility and responsiveness, such adjustment should not become a one-way process.
Wednesday, 4 February 2026
Article 3 ECHR and Chișinău: What Are the Stakes?
By Natasa Mavronicola, University of Birmingham
Article 3 ECHR is under pressure. At a recent informal ministerial conference in Strasbourg on human rights day, 10 December 2025, Ministers from 27 Member States of the Council of Europe prepared a joint statement that is likely to shape a political declaration at the next formal session of the Committee of Ministers in Chișinău in May 2026. Two stand-out elements of the statement concern Article 8 and Article 3 ECHR and indicate a push towards a re-writing or reinterpretation of these rights in order to facilitate expulsion decisions, and particularly the removal of ‘foreigners convicted of serious crimes’.
While references to the qualified right protected by Article 8 are overtly orientated at recalibrating the proportionality assessment involved in its application in order to favour individual removal decisions and generalised state expulsion policies, the statement is cast as seeking ‘clarity’ on Article 3, which enshrines an absolute right:
‘Clarity about inhuman and degrading treatment: The scope of “inhuman and degrading treatment” under Article 3, which is an absolute right, should be constrained to the most serious issues in a manner which does not prevent State Parties from taking proportionate decisions on the expulsion of foreign criminals, or in removal or extradition cases, including in cases raising issues concerning healthcare and prison conditions.’
The wording adopted suggests that the Ministers are taking issue with the contours of the non-refoulement duty under Article 3 ECHR. Yet while the motivation of the pursuit of ‘clarity’ is framed in terms of easing expulsions, the overarching goal appears to be to constrain the ‘scope’ of inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 more generally.
I have written extensively on Article 3 elsewhere, including in relation to non-refoulement and related state obligations pertaining to persons in irregular(ised) migration contexts (eg here and here), and I hope to write more on the specific wording being contemplated (eg in the recently published preliminary draft text from the CDDH) soon. For the purposes of this blog post, however, I consider these (re)new(ed) efforts to recast the absolute character and the scope of Article 3 ECHR in more fundamental terms, contemplating what is really at stake here. I argue that the ‘concessions’ sought on inhuman and degrading treatment strike at the absolute character and at the core, and not the (notional) periphery, of Article 3, and threaten the whole human rights edifice.
Absolute rights and red lines
Article 3 ECHR is a pithy provision whose categorical terms guarantee an absolute right: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The absolute character of a right entails that it is not displaceable – that is, the obligations corresponding to the right cannot be overridden by extraneous considerations. This understanding of absolute rights is clearly reflected in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Article 3.
The ECtHR distils the absolute character of Article 3 to three main elements (see, for example, Chahal v UK, para 79). First, Article 3 makes no provision for lawful exceptions. In contrast to other provisions within the ECHR, including Article 8 ECHR, there is no possibility of lawful interference that is deemed ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the fulfilment of a legitimate aim. Second, Article 15 ECHR does not allow for any derogation from Article 3 even in the event of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Lastly, as frequently underlined by the ECtHR, Article 3 ECHR protects everyone unconditionally, irrespective of their conduct. In other words, the protection conferred by Article 3 ECHR is not conditional on any quality or behaviour of the victim or potential victim.
Given that the Convention, as the ECtHR affirms, leaves no scope for Article 3 to be justifiably infringed or overridden, the interpretation and application of Article 3 ECHR necessarily involves drawing red lines between conclusively unlawful and potentially lawful State conduct. The ECtHR has developed a rich corpus of line-drawing case-law, with Article 3 being applied in a range of contexts well beyond the conventionally invoked scenario of interrogational torture – contexts such as police brutality, domestic violence, child abuse and child neglect, and subjection to degrading detention conditions and living conditions (see the analysis here, here and here). It has elaborated the now well-established non-refoulement obligation under Article 3 ECHR, which prohibits the removal of persons to places where there are substantial grounds to believe that they face a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Non-refoulement also necessarily entails a ‘procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to assess the risks of treatment contrary to that provision’ (MA and ZR v Cyprus, para 95).
The three elements of absoluteness outlined by the Court – no exceptions, no derogations, and the unconditional protection of all persons within the jurisdiction of Contracting States – shape the interpretation of the right. As I argue in my study on Article 3, to adhere to its absolute character, the contours of the right must be specified in such a way as to set a firm, and not porous, red line; through reasoning that relates to the nature of the wrongs at issue and not to extraneous considerations; and without displacing the right through the back door by incorporating qualifications, conditions, or other mechanisms of displacement into the right’s interpretation.
The nascent proposal we find in the 10 December statement is already indicative of reasoning that falls foul of the fundamentals of interpreting an absolute right. While it may purport to be concerned with ‘seriousness’, a word not dissimilar from the ECtHR’s references to a ‘minimum level of severity’ in drawing Article 3’s red line, the intent does not appear to be to grapple meaningfully with how severity is understood and why. The reference to seriousness as the qualifying criterion is swiftly followed by a more overt indication of what states seek to carve out of the right’s protection: ‘proportionate’ expulsion decisions. The words ‘in a manner which does not prevent’ make it clear that this is not an exercise in reasoning through notions of severity, but a push to redraw or arbitrarily vary the red line so as to enable states to expel, remove or extradite people more easily. The intention of carving out desired conduct, coupled with the use of the term ‘proportionate’, which alludes to extraneous considerations that purport to outweigh Article 3’s imperatives, exemplifies displacement (of at least elements of the right) through the back door.
Moreover, the statement beckons to the ECtHR to redirect the line-drawing to states. To the question of how to determine what constitutes treatment that is not serious enough to fall foul of Article 3 ECHR, the ministerial statement’s thinly veiled answer is ‘according to what states feel strongly about being allowed to do [in this instance, in the context of migration]’. What states wish to do is equated with a lack of gravity. The idea that the ECtHR should adjust the ‘minimum level of severity’ threshold to exclude certain action that states wish to take, in relation to people that they have little desire or political incentive to protect, contradicts not only absoluteness but also the rule of law. Human rights law is there to hold states to certain minimum standards, and these are meant to be delineated by the ECtHR on a basis distinct from whatever State authorities consider preferable or convenient in any given context.
The core of Article 3
It seems to me that implicit in what is being floated in these (re)new(ed) attempts to vary the scope of Article 3 is the notion that what is being proposed is merely tinkering with (or, euphemistically attaining ‘clarity’ on) the periphery of the right. This notion is false.
What is Article 3 about? Torture, the wrong identified in the title of the right enshrined in Article 3 (‘Prohibition of torture’), is not simply about the infliction of suffering. It involves, as Jay Bernstein has put it, showing to the victim ‘that her standing as human is insupportable and unsustainable’. Elaine Webster reflects that torture embodies, and indeed is an archetype of, ‘symbolic exclusion from the human community’. Michelle Farrell comments that torture is ‘the reduction of the human … to the status of less than human’. Jean Améry, seeing precisely this ‘quality’ in the torture he endured at the hands of the Nazis, argued that ‘torture was not an accidental quality of this Third Reich, but its very essence’.
There is, in torture, not just a violation of the human person themselves, but also a profound rupture in our relational humanity and a repudiation of the equal and elevated status ascribed within the human rights edifice to all human persons, and the basic respect and concern that it demands. It is for this reason that Améry saw torture as the ‘apotheosis’ of Nazism, which ‘hated the word “humanity” like the pious man hates sin, and [thus] spoke of “sentimental humanitarianism”’.
Article 3 stands against treatment that falls foul of our relational, deontic humanity – or, in other words, our human dignity. While inhumanity and degradation may not involve the fanfare of denial of human dignity that torture encompasses, they nonetheless fundamentally convey ‘that this creature does not matter, at least not like a person does’. They lie, in other words, on a continuum of radical othering.
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence reflects Article 3’s imperative of countering the many forms that dehumanisation can take, particularly in relation to persons who find themselves on the margins of public, political or indeed judicial goodwill. Besides its demands in the context of irregular(ised) migration, Article 3’s extensive application in the prison context goes some way to reclaim the humanity of people who are all too often at best disregarded and stigmatised and at worst treated as ‘human waste’.
Torture as well as inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment are part of a cycle of othering – they happen predominantly to persons who are othered, and mark them as ‘other’. These practices thrive where hatred, stigma, marginalisation, discrimination or systemic disregard prevail. Those whose life and welfare are rendered marginal are considerably more vulnerable to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
The 10 December statement is therefore all the more pernicious in this light: by foregrounding a perceived imperative of stripping non-nationals of certain protections established under Article 3 ECHR, the statement not only contradicts the unconditional character of Article 3 but exemplifies the dehumanisation that Article 3 was meant to guard against. Insofar as the proposals’ purpose is that of (explicitly or implicitly) demarcating those that particular publics think deserving of cruelty or inhumanity (or simply undeserving of rights), and reducing their protection from such abuses accordingly, they therefore stand at odds both with the right’s absoluteness and with the core of what the right stands for. Assuming that we can preserve the core or essence of Article 3 by making such concessions on the contours of inhuman or degrading treatment, or the non-refoulement duty, or both, would be deeply misguided.
The heart of human rights
What Article 3 proscribes goes to the heart of human rights. The ECtHR has repeatedly underlined that ‘the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity’ and that Article 3 is ‘closely bound up with respect for human dignity’. Article 3 stands as an archetype of a collective commitment to uphold human dignity in all circumstances, by ensuring that every human person is afforded a baseline of respect and concern. It should be noted that it does not represent our success in doing so – torture and inhuman and degrading treatment remain as pervasive as they are egregious, and this is indeed part of the reason why the duty not to remove people to places where they face a real risk of such abuse is an essential aspect of Article 3. In that sense, Article 3 constitutes a vital if yet unrealised promise to meet the demands of human dignity, and the jurisprudence that has emerged out of Article 3 represents a remarkable and perhaps unparalleled effort to do so within human rights law.
To abandon this promise in the way contemplated by the ministerial statement is to abandon the egalitarian, dignitarian premise of human rights. As the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O’Flaherty has aptly put it, the recent ministerial statement evokes a ‘hierarchy of people’, a stance associated with ideologies that reject the ‘human’ in human rights – and which Jean Améry recognised as fundamental to his experience of torture. Human dignity represents the rejection of such a hierarchy, and the absolute right protected by Article 3 ECHR constitutes one of the most potent concretisations of this rejection. Diluting or denting Article 3 in the manner proposed would be an attack on human dignity that would strike at the heart of human rights and threaten the whole human rights edifice.
Conclusion
Article 3 is a vital source of protection for people who fall through the cracks of majoritarian processes and dominant socio-political norms and practices, people who find themselves on the margins of society’s regard, disenfranchised or otherwise disempowered, and whose abuse might otherwise have faced too few barriers and attracted little meaningful redress or condemnation. Being a bulwark against such abuses was always Article 3’s purpose, and the basis for its absolute character: both because torture and inhuman and degrading treatment tend to be inflicted on persons who are othered, and, crucially, because the wrongs of torture, inhumanity and degradation have othering at their core.
It is precisely in contexts where it has attracted backlash, such as the migration context, that Article 3’s importance in vindicating the egalitarian character of human rights and the unconditional protection of human dignity is most evident. To continue to uphold Article 3 as an absolute right is to remain faithful to the premise and still-unrealised promise of human rights.
Saving Article 3 ECHR from the concessions or dilutions proposed in the 10 December statement is an imperative of the highest possible stakes. To borrow from Jeremy Waldron, messing with Article 3 ECHR in this manner does not begin our descent down the slippery slope, but finds us at the bottom.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Alan Greene, Corina Heri and Lydia Morgan for comments on earlier versions of this blog post.

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