It is my pleasure to present a guest post by a familiar author to returning readers of this blog, professor Dirk Voorhoof of Ghent University has written a guest commentary on the judgment in Perinçek v. Switzerland (Appl.no. 27510/08 of
17 December 2013,only available in French so far), a case on genocide denial. Here is the commentary:
Criminal
conviction for denying the existence of the Armenian “genocide” violates
freedom of expression
Dirk Voorhoof
[Update: please note this case was referred to the Grand Chamber in June 2014]
On 17 December 2013 the European Court of Human
Rights ruled by five votes to two that Switzerland
violated the right to freedom of expression by convicting Doğu Perinçek,
chairman of the Turkish Workers’ Party, for publicly denying the existence of
the genocide against the Armenian people. On several occasions, Perinçek had
described the Armenian genocide as “an international lie”. The Swiss courts found
Perinçek guilty of racial discrimination within the meaning of Article 261bis
of the Swiss Criminal Code. This article punishes inter alia the denial, gross minimisation or attempt of
justification of a genocide or crimes against humanity, publicly expressed with
the aim of lowering or discriminating against a person or a group of persons by
reference to race, ethnic background or religion in a way that affects the
human dignity of the person or group of persons concerned. According to the
Swiss courts, the Armenian genocide, like the Jewish genocide, was a proven
historical fact, recognised by the Swiss Parliament. They found that Perinçek’s
motives denying that the Ottoman Empire had perpetrated the crime of genocide
against the Armenian people in 1915 and the following years, were of a racist
tendency and did not contribute to the historical debate. Relying on Article 10
of the European Convention, Perinçek complained before the Strasbourg Court
that the Swiss authorities had breached his freedom of expression. In an
impressive judgment of 80 pages, only available in French for the moment, the
Court elaborates the issue profoundly. The judgment also contains in annex, on
18 pages, a firm and extensively documented dissenting opinion by two judges.
The judgment
First the European Court found
that Perinçek had not committed an abuse of his rights within the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention, prohibiting activities aimed at the destruction of
others’ rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. The Court underlined that
the free exercise of the right to openly discuss questions of a sensitive and
controversial nature was one of the fundamental aspects of freedom of
expression and distinguished a tolerant and pluralistic democratic society from
a totalitarian or dictatorial regime. The Court emphasised that the limit
beyond which comments may engage Article 17 lay in the question whether the aim
of the speech was to incite hatred or violence, aiming at the destruction of
the rights of others. The Court considered :
“(..) la limite tolérable pour que
des propos puissent tomber sous l’article 17 réside dans la question de savoir
si un discours a pour but d’inciter à la haine ou à la violence. La Cour estime
que le rejet de la qualification juridique des événements de 1915 n’était pas
de nature en lui-même à inciter à la haine contre le peuple arménien. De toute
façon, l’intéressé n’a été ni poursuivi ni puni pour incitation à la haine, qui
est une infraction distincte en vertu de l’alinéa premier de l’article 261bis
du code penal. Il n’apparait pas non plus que le
requérant ait exprimé du mépris à l’égard des victimes des événements en cause.
Dès lors, la Cour estime que le requérant n’a pas usurpé son droit de débattre
ouvertement des questions, même sensibles et susceptibles de déplaire.
L’exercice libre de ce droit est l’un des aspects fondamentaux de la liberté
d’expression et distingue une société démocratique, tolérante et pluraliste
d’un régime totalitaire ou dictatorial” (§ 52).
According to
the European Court, the rejection of the legal characterisation as “genocide”
of the 1915 events was not such as to incite hatred against the Armenian
people. The Court is of the opinion that Perinçek has not abused his right to
freedom of expression in a way prohibited by Article 17 of the Convention :
“(..) on ne
saurait prétendre que le requérant ait utilisé le droit à la liberté
d’expression à des fins contraires à la lettre et à l’esprit de la Convention
et, dès lors, détourné l’article 10 de sa vocation. Il n’y a donc pas lieu
d’appliquer l’article 17 de la Convention” (§ 54).
Next, from
the perspective of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court agreed with the
Swiss courts that Perinçek could not have been unaware that by describing the
Armenian genocide as an “international lie”, he was exposing himself on Swiss
territory to a criminal sanction “prescribed by law”. The Court also found that
the aim of the application of Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code was to
protect the rights of others, namely the honour of the relatives of victims of
the atrocities perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people
from 1915 onwards.
The crucial question was to
determine whether the prosecution and conviction of Perinçek had been “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court referred to its standard approach that
freedom of expression includes information and ideas that can offend, shock or
disturb some part of the population and that this principle is also applicable
within the domain of an open debate amongst historians :
“le principe
(..) selon lequel l’article
10 protège également les informations ou idées susceptibles de heurter, choquer
ou inquiéter vaut également lorsqu’il s’agit, comme en l’espèce, du débat historique, ‘dans
un domaine où la
certitude est improbable’” (§
102).
The Court is of the opinion
that discussion of the Armenian “genocide” was of great interest to the general
public and that Perinçek had engaged in speech of a historical, legal and
political nature which was part of a heated debate. Accordingly this limited
the margin of appreciation of the Swiss authorities in deciding whether the
interference with Perinçek’s freedom of expression was justified and necessary
in a democratic society :
“Partant, la Cour estime que le discours du
requérant était de nature à la fois historique, juridique et politique. Compte
tenu de ce qui précède et notamment de l’intérêt public que revêt le discours
du requérant, la Cour estime que la marge d’appréciation des autorités internes
était réduite” (§ 112-113).
According to the Court it is
still very difficult to identify a general consensus about the qualification of
the Armenian “genocide”. Only about 20 States out of the 190 worldwide have
officially recognised the Armenian genocide. Furthermore the notion of
“genocide” is a precisely defined and narrow legal concept, difficult to
substantiate. Historical research is by definition open to discussion and a matter
of debate, without necessarily giving rise to final conclusions or to the
assertion of objective and absolute truths. The Court is of the opinion that:
“En tout état de cause, il est même
douteux qu’il puisse y avoir un « consensus général », en particulier
scientifique, sur des événements tels que ceux qui sont en cause ici, étant
donné que la recherche historique est par définition controversée et discutable
et ne se prête guère à des conclusions définitives ou à des vérités objectives
et absolues” (§ 117).
In this
connection, the Court clearly distinguished the present case from those
concerning the negation of the crimes of the Holocaust, committed by the Nazi regime.
In the cases of convictions for Holocaust denial
the applicants had denied the historical facts even though they were sometimes
very concrete, such as the existence of the gas chambers. They had denied the
crimes perpetrated by the Nazi regime for which there had been a clear legal
basis. Lastly, the acts that they had called into question had been found by an
international court to be clearly established.
The Court took the view that
the Swiss authorities had failed to show how there was a social need in
Switzerland to punish an individual for racial discrimination on the basis of
declarations challenging the legal characterisation as “genocide” of acts
perpetrated on the territory of the former Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the
following years. While such a pressing social need did indeed exist, according
to the Court, regarding the denial of the Holocaust, this was not the case with
regard to the Armenian “genocide” :
“Par ailleurs, elle
partage l’avis du gouvernement turc selon lequel la négation de l’Holocauste
est aujourd’hui le moteur principal de l’antisémitisme. En effet, elle estime
qu’il s’agit d’un phénomène qui est encore d’actualité et contre lequel la
communauté internationale doit faire preuve de fermeté et de vigilance. On ne
saurait affirmer que le rejet de la qualification juridique de
« génocide » pour les événements tragiques intervenus en 1915 et dans
les années suivantes puisse avoir les mêmes répercussions” (§ 119).
From a comparative perspective,
analysing the legislation in 14 countries in Europe, it is also emphasised that
Switzerland is the only country that has incriminated the denial of the
Armenian genocide, while only Spain and Luxembourg have not limited their
genocide denial legislation to the Holocaust. The Court observes that “(t)ous les autres États n’ont apparemment pas ressenti un
«besoin social impérieux» de prévoir une telle législation” (§ 120).
The Court also mentioned the
French Constitutional Council’s decision in February 2012 in which it declared
unconstitutional a new provision in French law making the denial of the
existence of the genocides recognised by the law a criminal offence. The French
Constitutional Council found the new law to be incompatible with freedom of
expression and freedom of research. In the European Court’s view, the decision
of the French Constitutional Council showed that there was in principle no
contradiction between the official recognition of certain events as genocide
and the conclusion that it would be unconstitutional to impose criminal
sanctions on persons who questioned the official view :
“Elle estime que la décision du Conseil
constitutionnel montre parfaitement qu’il n’y a à priori pas de contradiction
entre la reconnaissance officielle de certains événements comme le génocide,
d’une part, et l’inconstitutionnalité des sanctions pénales pour des personnes
mettant en cause le point de vue officiel, d’autre part. Les États qui ont
reconnu le génocide arménien – pour la grande majorité d’entre eux par le biais
de leurs parlements – n’ont par ailleurs pas jugé nécessaire d’adopter des lois
prévoyant une répression pénale, conscients que l’un des buts principaux de la
liberté d’expression est de protéger les points de vue minoritaires,
susceptibles d’animer le débat sur des questions d’intérêt général qui ne sont
pas entièrement établies” (§ 123).
The European Court finally referred to the General Comment nr. 34 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on
Article 19 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, stating that “(l)aws that penalize the expression of
opinions about historical facts are incompatible with the obligations that the
Covenant imposes on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom of
opinion and expression. The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of
expressions of an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past
events".
In conclusion, the Court
expressed its doubt that Perinçek’s conviction had been dictated by a “pressing
social need”. It pointed out that it had to ensure that the sanction did not
constitute a kind of censorship which would lead people to refrain from
expressing criticism as part of a debate of general interest, because such a
sanction might dissuade contributions to the public discussion of questions
which were of interest for the life of the community. The Court found that the
grounds given by the national authorities in order to justify Perinçek’s
conviction were insufficient and that the domestic authorities had overstepped
their narrow margin of appreciation in this case in respect of a matter of
debate of undeniable public interest :
“Les
instances internes n’ont pas démontré en particulier que la condamnation du
requérant répondait à un « besoin social impérieux » ni qu’elle était
nécessaire, dans une société démocratique, pour la protection de l’honneur et
les sentiments des descendants des victimes des atrocités qui remontent aux
années 1915 et suivantes. Les instances internes ont donc dépassé la marge
d’appréciation réduite dont elles jouissaient dans le cas d’espèce, qui
s’inscrit dans un débat revêtant un intérêt public certain” (§
129).
The Court considered the
criminal conviction of Perinçek for denying
that the atrocities perpetrated against the Armenian people in 1915 and onwards
constituted genocide was unjustified. Accordingly there had been a violation of
Article 10.
Comment
The refusal by the European Court to consider Perinçek’s statements as
“abusive speech” under Article 17 of the Convention reflects legitimate concerns
about the inherent dangers applying the so-called abuse clause in cases of
freedom of political expression and debate on matters of public interest. It is
indeed preferable that the application of Article 17 in freedom of expression
cases remains very exceptional, as “une mesure que la Cour n’a que très rarement appliquée” (§ 47). By only accepting, eventually, the implementation of Article 17 in cases of
incitement to hatred or violence, aimed at the destruction of the rights of others
and disrespecting the text and spirit of the Convention, the Court prevents a
too broad application of Article 17. One can even
argue that applying the abuse clause to resolve free speech disputes is
undesirable in all circumstances (see H.
Cannie en D. Voorhoof, “The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the
European Human Rights Convention : an Added Value for Democracy and Human
Rights Protection?” NQHR Vol. 29/1,
54-83, 2011), but the
European Court clearly does not share that approach, yet.
Still the Court gives the impression to be willing to accept that a mere
denial of historical facts, whether they are a genocide, a crime against
humanity or a massacre, can be a sufficient justification for a restriction on
the right of freedom of expression and eventually for the application of
Article 17. Indeed, the Court considers it “important” that Perinçek has not
denied the facts of the Armenian deportations and massacres, and that he was
only denying the legal qualification to be given to these facts. The Court expresses the opinion that it is “important que le requérant n’a jamais
contesté qu’il y a eu des massacres et des déportations pendant les années en
cause. Ce qu’il nie, en revanche, c’est la seule qualification juridique de «
génocide » donnée à ces événements”
(§ 51). One can however question
the relevance of this consideration, as the Court’s position in the next
paragraph of the judgment clearly demonstrates that a denial as such of a genocide or crimes against
humanity is not excluded from the protection under Article 10. It is only when
the denial incites to hatred or violence that Article 17 can be applied. It is essential for the Court “que le rejet de la qualification juridique des événements de 1915
n’était pas de nature en lui-même à inciter à la haine contre le peuple
arménien. De toute façon, l’intéressé n’a été ni poursuivi ni puni pour
incitation à la haine, qui est une infraction distincte en vertu de l’alinéa
premier de l’article 261bis du code penal”. (§ 52)
Furthermore, the European Court rightly pointed out that this case is not about the legal, historical or political recognition
of the existence of the Armenian “genocide”, but only about the necessity of
the criminal conviction of Perinçek by the Swiss authorities because of the
content of some speeches Perinçek held in Switzerland arguing that the
massacres and deportations of Armenian people nearly 100 years ago did not
deserve the qualification as genocide. It
is certainly not up to the European Court to give an opinion on or to decide itself
on this issue : “La Cour rappelle par
ailleurs que, si la recherche de la vérité historique fait partie intégrante de
la liberté d’expression, il ne lui revient pas d’arbitrer des questions
historiques qui relèvent d’un débat toujours en cours entre historiens” (§
99). The Court emphasises that it is not
dealing with the underlying facts nor the legal qualification of them as a
“genocide”, as the Court “n’est amenée à
se prononcer ni sur la matérialité des massacres et déportations subies par le
peuple arménien aux mains de l’Empire ottoman à partir de 1915, ni sur
l’opportunité de qualifier juridiquement ces faits de « génocide »,
au sens de l’article l’art. 261bis, alinéa 4, du code penal” (§
111).
The essence of the message of this judgment is indeed that the legal,
political and historical discussion about facts situated in history should be
open and that all opinions discussing or interpreting these facts, including
provocative, offensive or disrespectful opinions, should be protected by
Article 10 of the Convention. The denial of historical facts or the discussion
about their legal or political qualification should never, as such, be considered as a criminal offence, unless the statements
or expressions also incite to hatred, discrimination or violence.
The European Court at a certain moment (§§ 114-116) gives the impression that it is because of the
lack of a general consensus in European and in the international community about
whether the massacres and deportations in Armenia in 1915 and the years after
constituted a genocide, that the denial by Perinçek of the existence of the
Armenian genocide was acceptable. The Court however seems to be aware that
accepting such an approach would risk to install by law historical truths,
based on general consensus, which cannot be denied, or critically and vehemently
discussed. Therefore the Court clarifies
that it is doubtful anyhow whether on such issues there can be ever a general consensus
: “En
tout état de cause, il est même douteux qu’il puisse y avoir un
« consensus général », en particulier scientifique, sur des événements
tels que ceux qui sont en cause ici, étant donné que la recherche historique
est par définition controversée et discutable et ne se prête guère à des
conclusions définitives ou à des vérités objectives et absolues ” (§ 117). The Court accepts nevertheless one exception, and that is the criminalisation
of denial of the Holocaust (§ 118), as, according to the Court, there is
general consensus about the Holocaust. Still, accepting that as such the denial of the Holocaust is a
justifiable restriction on freedom of expression, contrasts with the approach
expressed by the UN HRC in its General Comment nr. 34. In this Comment,
interpreting the actual scope, impact and application of the right to freedom
of opinion and expression under 19 Article ICCPR, the HRC opposed explicitly against “memory-laws”, emphasising that Article 19 ICCPR “does not permit general prohibition of expressions of an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events." (§ 49). The European Court, although it referred to and even
quoted from the General Comment nr. 34, missed the opportunity to elaborate on
this approach. It would indeed have been preferable if the Court had made clear
that the criminal prosecution and conviction for denial of historical facts,
also of those on which there is general consensus, such as the Holocaust, is only
justified from the perspective of Article 10 in so far as the denial of those
facts at the same time intentionally incites to hatred, discrimination or
violence against a person or a group of persons. In this case however, the
European Court did not need to take that additional step, which would also
imply that it distanced itself from its former jurisprudence finding that
criminal convictions and other sanctions for denial of the Holocaust did not
amount to a violation of Article 10, even in cases in which there was no clear
incitement to hatred, discrimination or violence, such as in the case of Bruno Gollnisch v. France (Decision
ECtHR 7 June 2011, Appl. Nr. 48135/08). In that case Gollnisch was dismissed
from university because in his texts and lectures he had claimed the right as a
historian to question and discuss the “official truth” about the Holocaust. The
European Court however considered Gollnisch’s complaint under Article 10 ECHR inadmissible.
The threshold that the European Court invokes in its
judgment of 17 December 2013 with regard to the application of Article 17 ECHR,
that in discussions about (dramatic and traumatic) historical facts there is
only an abuse of the right to freedom of expression when it concerns incitement
to hatred or violence, should indeed be unrelated to whether there is general
consensus or not about these historical facts. What can be criminalised from
the perspective of Article 10 is incitement to hatred and violence, while the
contestation or denial itself of historical facts, based on a (construed)
general consensus should not, and should never be, defined as a criminal
offence with the justification that such an interference with the right to
freedom of expression is necessary in a democratic society.
Finally, it is not surprising that the judgment on the controversial issue
related to the (denial of the) Armenian genocide is not delivered with
unanimity. Judges Sajó (Hungary) and the president of the Chamber, Raimondi (Italy)
expressed a joint concurring opinion, in which they additionally explain,
justify or clarify some of the legal arguments and considerations by the Second
Section’s majority in this case, finding a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention. Judges Vučinić (Montenegro) and Pinto de Albuquerque (Portugal) expressed
a joint partly dissenting opinion in which they argue that the conviction of
Perinçek did not amount to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention : “Quoi qu’il en soit, après
mûre réflexion, nous sommes parvenus à la conclusion qu’il n’y avait pas eu
violation de l’article 10 dans cette affaire”.
The judgment will become final on 17 March 2014, unless the case is
referred to the Grand Chamber under
Article 43 of the Convention. In some statements or preliminary reactions commenting on the Court’s judgment in Perinçek v. Switzerland, it is argued why the Swiss Government
should request such a referral in order to find Perinçek’s conviction necessary
in a democratic society. We sincerely doubt if a judgment by the Grand Chamber could
ever lead to such an outcome in this case. And if it would, it would certainly be
a sad day for freedom of expression in Europe.
At the occasion of the retirement from the European Court of the
Russian judge Anatoly Kovler, a liber amicorum has been compiled in his honour
by Olga Chernishova and Mikhail Lobov, entitled 'Russia and the European Courtof Human Rights: a decade of change. Essays in honour of Anatoly Kovler, Judgeof the European Court of Human Rights in 1999-2012'. The book has just been published by Wolf Legal Publishers and includes contribution in English and in French (with English sumaries). This is the abstract:
