New Book on Intersectionality and the ECHR

Today, Nani Jansen Reventlow (human rights lawyer and founder of Systemic Justice), Eddie Bruce-Jones (Professor at the University of London), Lyn K.L. Tjon Soei Len (Associate Professor at the Ohio State University) and Adam Weiss (Chief Programmes and Impact Officer, ClientEarth) published a new edited book entitled 'Intersectionality and Human Rights: Reimagining European Court of Human Rights Judgments'. The book contains contributions from activists, practitioners and academics in which recent judgments from the ECtHR are rewritten from an intersectionality perspective. This is the abstract:

'In this book activists, practitioners, and academics rewrite recent European Court of Human Rights judgments to respond to intersecting forms of oppression, discrimination, and other human rights harms. They illustrate how people with intersecting identities experience discrimination in complex ways that the Court often overlooks.

Using a collaborative and multidisciplinary approach, each chapter provides a vision for a jurisprudence that accounts for intersecting forms of oppression. This innovative legal paradigm of legal analysis contributes to the broader global field of critical rewrites that incorporates feminist, queer, and indigenous perspectives into existing judgments.

The book reimagines the Court’s case law through an intersectional lens, exploring issues spanning gender, race, religion, sexuality, and status. Ultimately, it demonstrates how judgments that fail to consider the impacts of intersecting axes of marginalisation and oppression can be reimagined – pointing to a future where European human rights jurisprudence is more responsive.

This book is an invaluable resource for scholars and students of European law, human rights, and public international law. It is also a vital read for legal practitioners and advocates working across European jurisdictions on human rights and equality for its innovative legal theory perspectives.'

Call to Sign an Open Letter Regarding the Future of the European Convention on Human Rights

In recent months, several Council of Europe member states have portrayed the ECHR and the ECtHR as obstacles to addressing migration issues in Europe. Some states have openly criticised the Court, while others have even suggested withdrawing from the Convention. It is in response to these worrying initiatives, that a number of academics working in the ECHR law have established the Agora Group, an independent, pan-European platform committed to open dialogue and balanced, evidence-based debate on key issues concerning the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Agora Group now counts nearly 800 colleagues from all parts of Europe.

It has come to our attention that the Council of Europe will soon establish an intergovernmental forum to discuss the concerns of member States as regards the ECtHR and the interpretation of Convention rights, particularly Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. Discussions held within the Council of Europe are welcome. However, the Agora Group has prepared an open letter to call on all those involved to ensure that such discussions are conducted in good faith and in a manner that respects the independence of the Court and the object and purpose of the Convention and the Statute of the Council of Europe. Failure to do so could significantly undermine the Convention system as a whole.

In the spirit of constructive engagement, and considering the importance of these initiatives from a large number of states, we invite all experts and academics working in the field of human rights to consider signing this open letter from the AGORA Group to the Council of Europe leadership. The letter will be formally issued to the Council of Europe next week.

Click here to read and sign the open letter.

Call for Abstracts: Revisiting the ECHR

The Human Rights Research Group of the Leuven University's Centre for Public Law has just launched a call for abstracts for a conference entitled 'Revisiting the ECHR: A Closer Look at Calls for Change'. The impetus for the conference was the by now (in)famous letter of last May by nine governments calling for changing the ECHR. As the governments phrased it in that letter: "We want to use our democratic mandate to launch a new and open-minded conversation about the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights. We have to restore the right balance.”

The conference will take place exactly one year after the letter;s publication, on 22 May 2026. Professor Başak Çalı (Oxford University) will be the keynote speaker. 

This is the call for abstracts:

'What started as an open letter in May 2025 has culminated in an increasingly articulate call by a large group of European leaders to revisit and reform the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). These leaders have pointed to the interpretation of the Convention as an impediment to policymaking and states’ interests, particularly in (but not limited to) migration matters. But what does it mean to point at Strasbourg and its judges as a roadblock to democratic governance? And how can and may governments address this issue?

While the political plans are still taking shape, the changing playing field calls for in-depth academic engagement. With this conference, the Human Rights Research Group at KU Leuven will create a space for open and balanced debate on the possibilities for reform and their implications. 

Authors of selected abstracts will be invited to develop these into full papers for publication in either an edited volume or a special issue.

We particularly invite abstracts that touch upon the following topics:

• Dialogue between the ECtHR and national authorities

• The asserted need to reform the ECHR and its judicial machinery 

• The different possibilities and mechanisms to revisit the interpretation of the ECHR

• The role of different actors in driving change at the Court 

• (Supranational) separation of powers

• The promise and limits of evolutive interpretation

• ECHR and migration

• The role of the ECHR within international migration law

• Tensions between the ECHR and particular states

Submission guidelines: Abstracts (max. 500 words) should be submitted to both koen.lemmens at kuleuven.be and eva.sevrin at kuleuven.be by 17 January 2026. Selected participants will be notified by 29 January 2026. For any inquiries, please contact the two organisers.'

Online Event on the ECHR and Immigration Detention

On Wednesday 12 November 2025 from 16:00-17:00 (CET), the Hertie School Centre for Fundamental Rights is organizing an online event entitled 'Immigration detention: Establishing clear boundaries in international human rights law'. The event will focus on a discussion of the European Court of Human Rights' case law on immigration detention. 

Here is a short description of the event:

'Many scholars have critiqued the ECtHR caselaw on immigration detention for failing to vindicate the right to liberty adequately and placing refugees and other vulnerable migrants at risk of arbitrary detention. The speakers will present their academic arguments, drawing on their academic writings, and suggest litigation strategies for those contesting immigration detention, and provide guidance for judges seeking to vindicate the rule of law and fundamental rights.

The speakers will discuss the paper titled “The Pre-Removal Detention of Immigrants: A Return to Ordinary Meaning” by Bas Schotel and Ingo Venzke.

About the paper: 

The EU Return Directive demands that immigrant detention be as short as possible, but, by logical implication, this also means that detention can be as long as necessary. What concerns the maximum length of detention, the Return Directive is remarkably generous: Immigrants can be detained for a period of up to eighteen months—a deprivation of liberty that is otherwise justified only as punishment for serious crimes. The practice of such long-term detention, now burgeoning, is highly questionable for moral, practical, and—our focus—legal reasons.

The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) provides the relevant yardstick. While discussions on the legality of immigrant detention have focused on requirements of necessity, we shift attention towards the surprisingly absent question of maximum duration. Our analysis delves into the drafting context of the ECHR to reveal that it only authorises the pre-removal detention of immigrants for markedly short periods. Picking up the interpretative canon of the regime, we note that meanings can of course change, but we argue that it is a legal mistake to consider that long-term detention is now sanctioned by the Convention.'

You can register here for the event.

New Book: Companion to the ECHR

My fellow blog editor Kushtrim Istrefi, together with Zane Ratniece, and Krešimir Kamber, have just yesterday, on the 75th anniversary of the ECHR, published The Companion to the European Convention on Human Rights with Brill Publishers. The editors, in many years of meticulous work, have guided dozens of expert authors to create almost 300 entries on the various concepts in the Convention and the Court's case-law. This in itself is a tour de force. The book is available as an E-book and later on will also be available in hardcopy.

This is the abstract:

'Over time the corpus of rights and obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights has developed into and is perhaps best understood as a system of autonomous concepts, with the European Court of Human Rights acting as its master of conceptualisation. The Companion to the European Convention on Human Rights seeks to identify and explain what these concepts are, how they have evolved, and how they have been applied by the Court. The Companion presents the first compilation and analysis of nearly 300 ECHR notions on Convention rights, principles, procedures and institutions.

The purpose of this book is to assist academics, judges and practitioners who specialise in the Convention and may require a trusted guide to specific notions which they encounter in their work. It is also designed to serve newcomers to the ECHR, such as students or public authorities, as a companion in their journey toward acquiring general or specialised knowledge in this area.'

Book presentations will follow at the European Court of Human Rights itself and at our own Netherlands Institute of Human Rights (SIM) at Utrecht University later on. Warm congratulations to Kushtrim, his fellow editors and all the authors - this will be a point of reference for work on the Convention for many years to come!

75 Years ECHR - Musings on a Birthday

Sometimes a photo can tell more than a thousand words: this black-and-white picture was taken exactly 75 years ago on 4 November 1950 in the Palazzo Barberini in Rome. Thirteen states (of which one even no longer exists, the Saar, now part of Germany) signed the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, later much more known under the acronym ECHR. Around the table one can see delegates of these states, only men at the time. At that moment, not many among them could fathom the momentum of the adoption of a new treaty. In fact, it seems almost a coincidental spate of luck of history in hindsight that it came about in the first place. Hopes, or more realistically expectations, among several people in the room were not very high for this short text on human rights. The Belgian former Prime Ministers and then President of the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly, Paul-Henri Spaak, even formally introduced the signing ceremony by saying: 'It is not a very good Convention, but it is a lovely palace', as Ed Bates recounts in his monumental history on the Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights.

It was a moment in European history that we celebrate today, exactly 75 years later. This ECHR blog has traveled for just over one fifth of that road along the ECHR's history and will continue to do so in the future. This week, there will be official celebrations in that same palace in Rome and countless seminars and lectures in academia and civil society across Europe. Zooming out from this moment, at the very least two stories could be told:

One is that of immense success: the number of state parties has grown to 46, hundreds of millions of people now fall under the protective scope of the Convention. The protective umbrella of human rights has also expanded in terms of rights, both through Protocols to the Convention, adding key rights such as the right to education, votings rights, and the abolition of the death penalty. Victims of abuses have gained direct access to an independent international court that assesses their claims and plays an important role in acknowledging wrongs and offering remedies and reparations. Social struggles in virtually all ECHR state parties have been aided by also using the tool of litigation before the Court to effect or increase social change. Discriminatory laws have been abolished, freedoms expanded, people in vulnerable situations recognised, states responsible for horrendous acts of torture or enforced disappearances have been held to account. Human rights have become a key language to address societal wrongs. Judges in all the 46 states have been applying ECHR norms and the case-law of the Court and in doing so deeply changed domestic legal orders, making them more open to human rights considerations. and in most cases still, states implement - sometimes very slowly - the judgments coming from Strasbourg. 

Another is that of increasing attacks and critique on the Convention and the Court. Earlier this year, the much-debated letter of nine European states calling for an open-minded conversation, specifically in the light of migration debates, put the spotlight on a recurring critique: that the Convention and especially the Court through its case-law, are going too far, are making too much of a dent in national sovereignty. While this may be the loudest, most visible critique, it is certainly not the only one. And it is important to emphasise that just as much critique has come from the other side of the argument, often heard from civil society: that the Court through its case-law is not doing enough, has blind spots, is not progressive enough. Probably every single practising lawyer or researcher can think of a judgment in which they think the Court really got it wrong. Indeed, academic critiques on the case-law and the ECHR system have been there since the adoption of the Convention, going both ways. One should thus be careful not to see the debate simplistically as states versus Court. Yet, it is undeniable that the critique coming from states has been more widespread and public than it used to be. It is especially concerning that this is often based on examples and arguments that do not accurately reflect facts. It is with that concern in mind that recent initiatives such as AGORA have come about to infuse the debate with factually correct information, about the Convention, the Court and its case-law. In the very democratic society that the ECHR was set up to protect, this is crucial. And I also see it as a role for those among us who are academics.

Whichever perspective one takes - and the historian in me would caution against taking one only - it is clear that the Convention has made its mark. Criticism means the Convention matters. Verbal and political attacks on the Court and its case-law means they matter. Calls for reform, whether by adding more rights or by weakening the system in the name of national sovereignty, means the ECHR matters. The thousands of publications about the Convention and the Court mean they matter. And last but not least, the tens of thousands of people turning to the Court to seek justice, means the Convention matters in the lives of people. 

Thus, even if the winds of change may be coming (or should one say storms), the building of what the European Convention on Human Rights stands for still holds and is of great value to millions of people, through its Court, through the victims which have bravely litigated thousands of cases, through civil society that has stood firm, through the case-law, the judges - European and domestic - applying its human rights, through the teachers that have raised generations of students about the basics of the Convention, and even through the state parties - the principal bearers of duty, with all their at times blaring failings in that regard. This whole sturdy, ever moving network of sometimes clashing, sometimes cooperating actors is still on the move, 75 years later, forming a membrane around that concise simple text that we now simply call the European Convention. So yes, in spite of all the challenges ahead, blind spots, failings of the past, and processes of trial and error, the ECHR is not only a living instrument, but also one that is alive and kicking. Happy birthday indeed!

Recording of Online Event on the ECHR in the Age of Backlash

A recording of the online inaugural event of the AGORA Group entitled 'The Age of Backlash: The European Convention on Human Rights and the New Political Reality' is now available for those who missed it or want to watch it again. This event took place yesterday 30 October and it explored the political pressure and challenges the system of the European Convention on Human Rights is facing. The event also marked the official launch of the AGORA Group, a new pan-European platform dedicated to an open, evidence-based dialogue on issues concerning the ECHR. You can read more about the platform in this earlier guest post written by the Group's initiator, Andrew Forde. 

The recording can be found here.

New ECHR Readings

Please find below another new selection of recent academic publications on the European Convention on Human Rights and its Court. Enjoy reading!

* Sebastián Alejandro Rey, ‘Advances and Setbacks in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights on Serious Violations of Human Rights’(2025) 14/1, International Human Rights Review:

 

‘This article examines the advances and setbacks in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Strasbourg Court) on serious violations of human rights since its first major judgment: the ‘Greek Case’. In particular, it focuses on the arguments advanced by the ECtHR to justify the use of criminal law as a means to ensure the respect and guarantee of human rights. The article also considers the scope assigned to the duty to investigate and punish serious violations of human rights, as well as the Court’s interpretation of the principle of legality and the applicability of statutory limitations to these crimes. The article makes references to the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances.’

 

* Dominika Bek and Magdalena Półtorak, ‘The Impact of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) on European Criminal Law Standards in the Area of Selected Culturally Motivated Crimes’, (2025)14/1, International Human Rights Review:

 

‘This article examines gender-determined vulnerability within the context of the Istanbul Convention, which aims to combat violence against women and domestic violence. It discusses the implementation challenges faced by States, particularly Poland, in addressing culturally motivated crimes like forced marriage and female genital mutilation. The article analyses whether recent legal changes align with the Convention’s goals and explore the impact of grevio’s evaluations on national criminal laws. The study emphasises the need to tackle underlying gender inequalities and stereotypes to effectively protect vulnerable groups and ensure justice for victims of violence.’

 

* Hannah Zaruchas, ‘Playing for Time: Temporary Status, Migration Control and the Human Rights of Forced Migrants to Family Reunification’ (2025) XX, pp. 1–21, International Journal of Refugee law:

 

‘The article analyzes a set of cases in front of the European Court of Human Rights in which forced migrants challenged restrictions to family reunification in human rights law. These restrictions were largely justified by States through the temporary nature of the sponsor’s migration status. Taking this argument as a starting point, the article brings legal analysis into conversation with normative theory to disentangle the relationship between migration status, temporality, and the human right to family life. It reconstructs what role the sponsor’s membership interests play in the assessment of their interest in family reunification under the ECHR. Then it is shown that membership is largely defined by reference to the temporal qualifications of a stay made by migration status. While the temporary nature of one’s stay entails an argument for exclusion, a permanent stay entails an argument for inclusion. However,the case of refugees shows that rights are also extended based on the prediction that a stay is likely permanent. This prediction is made in the form of migration status. The article then explores avenues for contesting the presumption of temporariness made by temporary status in human rights law. While temporariness can be challenged retrospectively based on other notions of membership than migration status such as ties and the length of stay, it is structurally difficult to challenge in its prospective dimension. This gap between the prospective prescription of temporariness through migration status and the retrospective claim to inclusion through human rights allows States to significantly delay interests in family reunification, gaining weight through temporary status.’

  

* Witold Klaus and Magdalena Kmak, ‘ECtHR jurisprudence amid political shifts: rolling back the protection against pushback’ (2025) 29/8, The International Journal of Human Rights:

 

‘In this article, we scrutinise the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments issued in cases of border protection and pushbacks since 2016. We argue that these judgments issued amid political shifts on national and regional levels and mounting criticism of the Court have generated interconnected effects of (1) lowering the standards of protection of the people on the move; (2) shifting the emphasis from human rights protection at the border towards protection of the border; and (3) particularisation of rights protection by limiting protection of certain groups of people on the move. Such a process leads, as we argue, to undermining the Court’s original mandate from primarily safeguarding individuals’ human rights (the person-centric mandate) towards foregrounding the sovereignty of states.’

 

* Esra Demir-Gürsel, ‘The shifting frames of the Council of Europe: from totalitarianism to authoritarianism, from populism to democratic backsliding’ (2025) 29/8, The International Journal of Human Rights:

 

‘Over the past two decades, several European states have undergone a notable shift away from liberal democracy and human rights. These trends have disrupted the foundational discourses of the Council of Europe (CoE), which historically has positioned Europe as a bastion of human rights and democracy. Various terms – including illiberalism, populism, authoritarianism, and democratic backsliding – have been used to describe these developments. In the CoE context, ‘populism’ and ‘democratic backsliding’ have become dominant frames for defining internal trends against the image that the CoE constructs for Europe, while ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘authoritarianism’ have been used to frame its past and present external Others. This article examines how these four concepts – totalitarianism, authoritarianism, populism, and democratic backsliding – are deployed within the CoE to analyse their discursive functions across different phases of the CoE’s history. Drawing on frame analysis, it traces how and to which effect these concepts have been mobilised in the CoE context. The article concludes that these concepts are employed less to denote clearly differentiated political forms or categories with distinct political and legal implications; rather, they are used as discursive tools to frame Europe as associated with human rights and democracy, in opposition to its external Others.’

 

* Grażyna Baranowska, ‘Making pushback facts visible: a review of tools in existing case law and the procedural framework of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2025) 29/8,  The International Journal of Human Rights:

 

‘Pushbacks are practices which result in migrants being forced across borders without an individual assessment of their protection needs. Pushback facts, however, often remain invisible in ECtHR case law because judges rely on state evidence, while states do not consistently record their practice and prevent migrants and civil society organisations from producing evidence. Additionally, states have at times failed to submit requested evidence or submit wrong or incomplete information. Our article intervenes in this problematic context to ask whether and how the ECtHR can make pushback facts visible. Combining case law analysis with an empirical analysis of adjudication and litigation practices, we argue that the ECtHR can make pushback facts visible by mobilising existing tools to gather more evidence and analyse existing evidence in the light of the above-described context. With this argument, we highlight and bridge a crucial divide: while social sciences illuminate the context of evidence gathering, legal scholarship focuses on the analysis of evidence. By interweaving both approaches, this interdisciplinary article proposes a way forward that is both supportive for the ECtHR in its assessment of the factual circumstances of pushback cases, whilst also effective in view of existing case law and the procedural framework.’

 

* Nurbanu Hayir, ‘Non-member migrants in spaceless zones: the spatial membership frame of embassies and consulates in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2025) 29/7, The International Journal of Human Rights:

 

‘This article discusses the two competing frames of human rights in European legal and political thought that continue to undergird the competing claims on externalised migration control in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): rights of humans against the European state power (a relational frame) versus human rights of Europeans (a spatial membership frame). Drawing from the case of asylum-seeking visa applicants at a Belgian embassy, M.N. and Others v.Belgium (2020), the article traces the prevalence of the spatial membership frame in the history of the ECtHR and the European consular jurisdiction under capitulation treaties in the eighteenth to nineteenth century to capture its recurrence in contemporary European human rights thinking on migration. It explores the influence of European interests in colonies during the Convention drafting and in ‘semi-civilised' regions such as the Ottoman Empire, Japan and China on the development of extraterritorial European jurisdiction. These interests shaped a spatial membership frame that prioritised the rights of European nationals, both at home and abroad, while excluding non-nationals from protection despite Europe's expansive sovereignty. It then reflects on how this spatial membership frame influences the ECtHR’s approach to embassies and consulates in human rights law.’

Online Event on the ECHR and Armed Conflict

On Wednesday 19 November 2025 from 12:00-13:00 (CET), the Hertie School Centre for Fundamental Rights is organizing an online research event entitled 'Human rights in armed conflict after the Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia judgment'. This online event will focus on an exploration of the merits part of the ECtHR's Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia. The presentation will be given by professor Marko Milanović (University of Reading School of Law, UK). The event is part of the Fundamental Rights Research Colloquium under the "Human Rights in Times of War" cluster organized by the Hertie School Centre for Fundamental Rights.

Here is a short description of the event:

'This talk will explore the merits judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in its probably most important interstate case, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia. The talk will explain what the Court decided on issues such as the extraterritorial application of the European Convention and the interaction between human rights law and the law of armed conflict. It will then provide some thoughts on how the law will develop in this area.'

You can register here for the event. 

Call for Papers: The European Yearbook on Human Rights (EYHR) 2026

The European Yearbook on Human Rights (EYHR) has just launched a Call for Papers for its 2026 edition on topical developments in the field of human rights in and beyond Europe. The year 2026 will mark the anniversary of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The 2026 edition of the EYHR will reflect on and explore the interaction between the European human rights system, with the Council of Europe, the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and  international and other regional human rights systems. 

Here is the Call for Papers:

'The European Yearbook on Human Rights (EYHR) invites submissions for its 2026 edition on topical developments in the field of human rights in Europe and beyond. 2026 marks the anniversaries of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). We will take the opportunity to take a step back and explore how the European human rights system, anchored in the Council of Europe, the EU and the OSCE, has interacted and has been shaped and influenced by the international and other regional human rights systems. 

The European human rights system has long been regarded as a global leader in human rights protection. However, it has also faced criticism for lagging behind or failing to adequately address emerging human rights issues. This call for papers seeks to critically examine the interconnections, synergies, and divergences between the international, regional and the European human rights systems. We are particularly interested in contributions that

- Reflect on the legacy and relevance of the ICCPR and ICESCR in shaping European human rights law and practice.

- Analyze areas where the European human rights system has demonstrated leadership and innovation, serving as a model for other regions or the international system.

- Identify areas where the European system has fallen short and could benefit from lessons learned from the international or other regional human rights systems.

We welcome submissions from academics, practitioners, policymakers, and human rights advocates that address, but are not limited to, the following themes:

The Legacy of the International Covenants on Human Rights in Europe 

- How have the ICCPR and ICESCR influenced the development of European human rights law and jurisprudence? 

- To what extent have European institutions, such as the ECtHR and the EU, integrated the principles of the Covenants into their frameworks? 

European Leadership in Human Rights Protection 

- In which areas has the European human rights system set global standards or led the way in innovative approaches? Examples may include the protection of privacy and data rights, the prohibition of torture, or the advancement of LGBTQ+ rights. 

- How has the European system influenced the development of international human rights norms and practices? 

- What lessons can other regions or the international system learn from Europe’s successes?

Areas of Weakness and Opportunities for Learning 

- Where has the European human rights system struggled to meet its obligations or adapt to new challenges? Examples may include the protection of socio-economic rights, addressing systemic racism, or ensuring accountability for human rights violations in conflict zones. 

- How can the European system draw on the experiences of the international human rights system or other regional mechanisms (e.g., the Inter-American or African human rights systems) to address these gaps? 

Emerging Challenges and the Way Forward 

- How can the European and international and regional human rights systems work together to address emerging global challenges, such as artificial intelligence, climate change, and pandemics? 

- What mechanisms or reforms are needed to enhance the interplay between the European and international systems?

- How can civil society and other stakeholders contribute to bridging gaps and fostering collaboration between these systems?

Authors will be invited to submit full contributions based on an abstract (max 500 words) that should be send by 5 December 2025. Abstracts should be submitted with a short bio to lisa.heschl@uni-graz.at. The deadline for submitting the manuscript is end of March 2026. 

The Yearbook is edited by representatives of the major Austrian human rights research, training and teaching institutions – the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy of the University of Graz; the Austrian Human Rights Institute of the University of Salzburg and the Vienna Forum for Democracy and Human Rights – as well as the Global Campus of Human Rights, Venice. It is published by Brill and all contributions are subject to a double-blind review process ensuring the highest academic standards.'

E.A. v. France: Judicial revictimisation of a survivor of sadistic sexual harassment at work. Ignoring a coercive control context to impute ‘consent’ to the victim

By Margarita S. Ilieva

Introduction

On 4 September 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) rendered a landmark judgment in E.A. and Association européenne contre les violences faites aux femmes au travail v. France. For the first time, the Court: 1) mapped criteria to determine lacking consent in sexual violence (SV) cases; 2) used, and defined, coercive control in sexual relationships; 3) established that a coercive control context is relevant to determining consent; 4) held that using past agreement coerced in a controlling relationship to derive consent to sex acts is victim blaming (‘culpabilisant, stigmatisant’), and, therefore, revictimisation barring victims’ access to justice. Yet, as in the other three cases of workplace sexual harassment, the Court ignored the crux of the matter, namely, gender discrimination.
 
After summarising the facts and the judgment, I will discuss this and other gaps, as well as the precedential value of E.A., against the backdrop of earlier SV cases.
 
Facts
 
E.A. suffered coercive control in a violent sexual relationship with a supervisor. She was 26 years old, an assistant pharmacist in training, on temporary contract. Her abuser, the department head, was 16 years older. (§§4-5, 7-8, 65) Their relationship was sadomasochistic, with E.A. receiving severe and frequent degrading treatment, beating, and forced sexual acts, including anal penetration. (§20) She suffered bleeding, bruises, inflammation, and pain while walking. (§28) He had her sign a ‘contract between the master and his bitch’, which listed her ‘duties’ to:

‘regularly suck her master’; wear a collar; accept to be ‘fucked by others in the presence of her master’; inform her ‘master’ when going out and wear a ‘chastity belt’; ‘take care of/ massage her master’s dick’; act ‘obedient and devoted to her master’; wear clothes, underwear, and makeup chosen by her ‘master’; eat from a bowl at her ‘master’s feet’; ‘pee with the door open for her master to hear daily’; send her ‘master’ a daily photo with her underwear lowered; send him her daily agenda; take beatings on her behind when not respecting his ‘orders’; and more. (§11) 

That contract had the abuser’s professional seal as head on it. (§11)
 
The abuser had established domination over her, keeping her in dependency. He demanded sex at work and that she say she was his ‘shit’. He urinated on her to ‘mark his territory’ and forced her to use an email address entitled chiennkb@laposte.net (‘bitch[his initials]’). E.A. unsuccessfully tried to break up, which exacerbated his professional harassment of her. (§21) He threatened her with professional consequences and often devalued and humiliated her before colleagues. (§§15, 25, 30)
 
E.A. feared his influence on her professional future, including regarding a procedure to obtain permanent employment. With a fixed-term contract, she risked having to cover her tuition’s cost if she left. (§26)
 
E.A. was diagnosed with severe PTSD and depression and placed on indefinite medical leave. (§§9, 22) She was hospitalised in a psychiatry for a long period. She was assessed as ‘destroyed in terms of psychological balance’, displaying ‘hostage syndrome’, with symptoms typical of SV victims. The psychiatrist stressed that her vulnerability could not be unknown to her abuser. (§37)
 
During the ensuing criminal investigation, another expert confirmed E.A.’s symptoms and her relationship with the abuser being sadomasochistic and coercively controlling. The abuser had disbalanced and plunged E.A. in significant moral distress. Her statements matched her emotional state. (§51)
 
The abuser was investigated for violence and sexual harassment abusing a position of authority. (§44) However, the investigators failed to pursue the rapes and other SV E.A. complained of. (§65) The abuser was brought before a tribunal incompetent to hear rape cases. (§58) While the first instance convicted him, the appeals court fully acquitted him, relying on E.A.’s ‘consent’ given in the ‘master-bitch contract’. (§§66, 71-3) The last instance refused to reexamine this. (§76)
 
Judgment
 
The Court reaffirmed that an investigation into alleged SV must focus on (lacking) consent. Consent must express free will at the moment sex is occurring. (§140) The authorities have a duty to examine all the facts and determine consent based on their entirety, carrying out a contextual analysis. (§§141-2)
 
Importantly, the Court listed factors for lacking consent:
 
- an unbalanced relationship between accused and victim;
- victim’s youth/ age disparity;
- victim’s psychological fragility/ particular vulnerability, her capacity for judgment, (lack of) sexual experience, or drunken/ intoxicated state;
- any ‘freezing’ during the acts;
- the acts’ impact on victim;
- perpetrator aware of her vulnerability, and/ or using a relationship of trust or status; circumstances conducive to coercion, such as deserted place or multiple aggressors. (§143)   
 
Regarding SV in professional contexts, the Court reiterated that power imbalances (victim’s position of subordination) are an important contextual element when assessing a victim’s behaviour. (§145)
 
The Court reiterated that French criminal law is inadequate to protect against non-consensual sex acts (see, for a similar finding, L. et Autres c. France (2025) analysed here). Relying on GREVIO, it found French rape law to be deficient as the provisions did not refer to ‘consent’ (§148-9) The Court noted a growing European consensus to expressly define rape and SV by  lacking informed consent. The legislation must provide for criteria to evaluate free will. (§150)

Furthermore, the authorities failed to implement the law in practice: effective investigation and punishment for the perpetrator was lacking. E.A.’s complaint contained credible (anal) rape and other SV allegations, which were not investigated despite their particular gravity. (§§153-4) The investigation took insufficient account of the control exercised by the abuser and the severe impact on E.A.’s health. It was crucial to assess whether such circumstances allowed free consent. (§§156-9) The courts refused to consider rape and SV charges as no ‘violence, constraint, threat, or surprise’ was proven, in their view. Despite acknowledging E.A.’s fragility and her aggressor’s abuse of professional status, his professional threats, and his aggressive humiliation of her in professional situations, which had all eroded E.A.’s health and caused her to submit to him, they did not draw any conclusions from that context regarding her ‘consent’. (§161)

The facts had to be assessed in their professional context. (§165) The abuser exercised functional authority over E.A., his post giving him real power over her. E.A. was a young professional whose employment status depended on her success in a competition, which her abuser had threatened to intervene in. He was vindictive towards her and used his status to discredit and isolate her professionally. (§165)   
 
Moreover, the sexual acts had a context of repeated psychological violence, including increasing humiliation. The abuser exercised growing surveillance over E.A.’s daily life and deliberately used emotional ambivalence towards her. Importantly, the ECtHR characterised this as coercive control, defining it as an entirety of behaviours typical of relationships marked by domination in which one individual aims to persistently control their partner and their partner’s life affecting their psychological integrity and personal autonomy. (§166) The Court relied on GREVIO reports discussing such control in intimate partner violence contexts. It noted that coercive control is likely to render the victim particularly vulnerable, affecting their judgment. An authority had found that the abuser had ‘extremely significant hold’ over E.A. (§166) However, the courts had failed to take into account her professional vulnerability and the major deterioration of her mental health, causing her psychiatric hospitalisation for many months. (§167-8)   
 
Importantly, the Court concluded that the manner in which the courts had imputed consent to E.A. based on the ‘master-bitch contract’ amounted to her secondary victimisation. (§170) It stressed that no manner of past agreement, including a written contract, is capable of amounting to consent, consent being by nature revocable. The courts should have completely ignored the ‘contract’ between E.A. and her abuser. (§169)    
 
Indeed, the Court held, the ‘master-bitch contract’ which the abuser made E.A. sign was one of the instruments of his coercive control. By holding her signature against her, the courts had exposed E.A. to secondary victimisation. Such reasoning was guilt-inducing, stigmatising, and liable to dissuade SV victims from enforcing their rights. The authorities had failed their duty to protect E.A.’s dignity. (§170)    
 
In conclusion, the gaps in the domestic legislation and the deficiencies in its implementation - among others, excluding SV from the investigation and misinterpreting E.A.’s consent - amounted to a failure of the state to meet its positive duties to address sexual violence in violation of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. (§171)    
 
Commentary
 
E.A. is a future-relevant precedent. The ECtHR has significantly developed rape and sexual harassment law under the ECHR by setting out illustrative conditions in which free, informed consent should be found lacking. It has integrated the notion of coercive control in sexual relationships as an important aspect of the requisite contextual analysis when assessing consent. Now explicitly under ECHR law, a coercive control context exacerbates a victim’s vulnerability affecting her ability to freely consent. Furthermore, the Court has built on its acknowledgment that only present consent is consent, now also outside of marriage contexts.

(See H.W. v. France (2025) for the first holding that only present consent is relevant: contrary to what the Govt had asserted before the Court (!), consent to marriage could not imply consent to future sex; enforcing ‘marital duties’ went against the duty to combat sexual violence, including marital rape (§91).)

E.A. is a landmark, recognising that, for judges to use past consent, especially in a coercive control context, in order to construct consent to a sexual act is revictimisation, blaming survivors and discouraging them from reporting SV. The Court has explicitly grounded the duty to refrain from such victim stigmatisation in respect for victims’ dignity, using dignity-based analysis to uphold victims’ rights.

E.A. is only the third case of SV impunity, after L. v. France and J.L. v. Italy, in which the Court has recognised judicial victim-shaming and blaming (‘guilt-inducing and stigmatising’ reasons) as revictimisation and a breach of the ECHR per se. In two other cases, respectively, workplace sexual harassment and online violence by a former partner (revenge porn), the Court recognised negative gender stereotyping as stigmatising and revictimising, however, in a limited manner and not as a separate breach (M.Ș.D. v. Romania, §147-8, see commentary; C v. Romania, §83-5, see commentary).

E.A. is a solid advancement compared to all these cases, as the Court found revictimisation based on mere imputation of consent, with no additional misogynist language, while in the earlier cases there had been offensive stereotyping and sexist insults/ humiliating remarks as well. 

On the other hand, unlike L. v. France, but like earlier cases of judicial victim-blaming of SV survivors, in which the Court, despite finding revictimisation, simply refused to address discrimination complaints (commentary on this), E.A. ignores gender inequality as the root cause of such revictimisation. E.A. made no discrimination allegation, possibly influenced by the Court’s tendency to dismiss such allegations as ‘unnecessary’ (M.Ș.D. v. Romania, J.L. v. Italy) or as requiring evidence for Article 14 to even apply (C v. Romania). However, under international law, sexual harassment/ violence is unquestionably gendered. Under the Istanbul Convention (IC), sexual harassment is a form of violence against women (VAW). 

Equally, under EU law, including the VAW Directive, criminal sexual harassment is a form of VAW. Under the gender equality directives (2006/54/EC, 2010/41/EU), sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination. Under the Victims’ Directive, sexual harassment is a form of GBV.     
 
Under ILO Convention 190, sexual harassment is included in GBV and gender-based harassment. Under CEDAW, sexual harassment is a form of GBV affecting women. GBV is rooted in men’s entitlement and privilege over women, social norms regarding the need to assert male control or power, enforce gender roles or prevent or punish what is considered to be unacceptable female behaviour. Those factors also contribute to the explicit or implicit social acceptance of GBV and the widespread impunity (General recommendation No. 35).
 
The application of preconceived and stereotypical notions of what constitutes GBV, what women’s responses to such violence should be, and the standard of proof required to substantiate its occurrence affect women’s rights to equality before the law, a fair trial and effective remedy. ‘Often judges adopt rigid standards about what they consider to be appropriate behavior for women and penalize those who do not conform to these stereotypes.’ (CEDAW 2015)
 
In E.A., the Court consistently relied on the IC and GREVIO materials, but failed to acknowledge the gendered nature of E.A.’s victimisation by her abuser and to scrutinise her judicial revictimisation for gender bias. Indeed, regarding victims’ rights in principle, the Court reaffirmed that ‘it is essential for [judges] to avoid reproducing sexist stereotypes in decisions, to downplay [GBV], and to expose women to secondary victimisation by using guilt-inducing language’. (§138) [emphasis added] At the same time, in its reasoning regarding E.A.’s specific case, it never once mentioned that she was victimised as a woman enduring GBV and then, revictimised as a woman by sexist stereotyping.

E.A. is one of a total of four workplace sexual harassment cases decided by the Court: Allée c. France (2024); Vučković v. Croatia (2023); and C. v. Romania (2022) analysed here. In none of those cases did the Court engage with the underlying issue of gender discrimination. In this regard, E.A. is another missed opportunity for the Court to acknowledge that sexual harassment being inherently gendered and thus, discriminatory, , any failure to properly address it, especially at the level of legislation and judicial decisions denying victimhood/ blaming victims, should be scrutinised as likely being discriminatory too. However, in C. v. Romania (2022), the Court refused to apply Article 14, implying that the applicant in such a case has a burden of proof for sheer applicability. C. failed to meet that, not providing ‘any material to allow the Court to assess the existence of potential discrimination’ (§90). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the applicants following her in Vučković, Allée, and E.A. did not raise Article 14 allegations, although they all faced their abusers’ impunity, and one of the victims, Allée, was in fact punished instead of him, for exposing him.
 
The Court has often held it unnecessary to respond to discrimination claims (see critique). On the other hand, as master of the characterisation of the facts – a power it frequently relies on – it has never, not once, considered it necessary to engage with underlying (gender) (in)equality where the applicants silenced themselves on that issue. 
 
I argue that the Court discourages discrimination claims, which may have contributed to E.A.'s not making such a claim. The Court routinely edits applicants' claims, applying articles it prefers, discarding some of the ones they raised, especially A14. It should be able and willing to do the reverse as well - apply an article the applicant omitted if the facts warrant it, especially Article 14 in a GBV case, in which the courts revictimised the woman. In E.A., at the very least, it could and should have integrated a discrimination analysis under Articles 8 and/or 3, as it has done in other cases. 

Next, the Court did not qualify E.A.’s revictimisation as a breach of a negative State duty (to refrain from wrongdoing). It only found positive duties (to act protectively) were breached. (§171) This omission typifies the Court’s approach to judicial stigmatisation of SV/ GBV victims (L. v. France, J.L. v. Italy, M.Ș.D. v. Romania, C v. Romania). The Court stops short of condemning the domestic judges for what they did, framing it instead as something they let happen: they ‘exposed’ the victim to revictimisation rather than committed her revictimisation themselves (see critique).

The Court has recognised domestic judicial leniency as barring access to justice in SV cases, dissuading victims from reporting pervasive abuse (Vučković v. Croatia). However, it may not have examined its own arguable lack of strictness with judges blaming victims in such cases, shielding them from being named as gender-biased, active perpetrators of discriminatory harm. The consequences of its leniency in this regard may be seen as similar: in E.A, and other cases of impunity for SV, the revictimised women did not allege discrimination, their possible Article 14 claims possibly discouraged by ECHR case law.

The Court should help women articulate their inequality, not silence them by creating expectations that they would be dismissed if they attempt to enforce their equality rights on a par with other Convention rights, that their voices would be mute if they named male privilege.