
The European Court ruled, in line with earlier case law on medical situations, that the life-threatening nature of the disease brought the case within the scope of the right to life (Article 2 ECHR). It held that although the national courts had taken a "sensitive and positive approach" in determining liability, the remedy offered had been insufficient. Being very specific, the Court held that the most appropriate remedy, in the circumstances of the case, would have been to award not only non-pecuniary damages, but also lifetime payment of healthcare and medical expenses for the boy. In addition, the Court noted that the administrative proceedings had been excessive, also considering the public health and safety reasons to prevent further similar errors. Unanimously, the Court found a violation of the right to life.
Apart from the order of lifetime medical expenses to be given to the boy, the Court also ordered Turkey to pay 300,000 euros for pecuniary damages and 78,000 for non-pecuniary damages. One judge, Sajó, dissented on the issue of just satisfaction. While clearly agreeing that the situation was heartbreaking and that this Turkish case can be compared to a Greek (sic!) tragedy, he argues that the parents should have exhausted domestic remedies on this issue more fully and should have presented more substantiation on the financial point. In the balance the Court has to strike between three issues ("it has to be human, it has to serve rights, and it has to operate as a court.") the Court gave a bit too much precedence to the first consideration, according to Sajó. One can, on technical grounds, agree with him. But to use another metaphor, the Court in this case issued a Salomonic judgment: maybe not perfect from a purely technical point of view, but infused (apologies for using that word here) with a deep humanity. A good case for discussions on ethics and the law and the balance between both.