Tuesday, 28 October 2025
Call for Papers: The European Yearbook on Human Rights (EYHR) 2026
Friday, 24 October 2025
E.A. v. France: Judicial revictimisation of a survivor of sadistic sexual harassment at work. Ignoring a coercive control context to impute ‘consent’ to the victim
Introduction
On 4 September 2025, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) rendered a landmark judgment in E.A. and Association européenne contre les violences faites aux femmes au travail v. France. For the first time, the Court: 1) mapped criteria to determine lacking consent in sexual violence (SV) cases; 2) used, and defined, coercive control in sexual relationships; 3) established that a coercive control context is relevant to determining consent; 4) held that using past agreement coerced in a controlling relationship to derive consent to sex acts is victim blaming (‘culpabilisant, stigmatisant’), and, therefore, revictimisation barring victims’ access to justice. Yet, as in the other three cases of workplace sexual harassment, the Court ignored the crux of the matter, namely, gender discrimination.
‘regularly suck her master’; wear a collar; accept to be ‘fucked by others in the presence of her master’; inform her ‘master’ when going out and wear a ‘chastity belt’; ‘take care of/ massage her master’s dick’; act ‘obedient and devoted to her master’; wear clothes, underwear, and makeup chosen by her ‘master’; eat from a bowl at her ‘master’s feet’; ‘pee with the door open for her master to hear daily’; send her ‘master’ a daily photo with her underwear lowered; send him her daily agenda; take beatings on her behind when not respecting his ‘orders’; and more. (§11)
That contract had the abuser’s professional seal as head on it. (§11)
- victim’s youth/ age disparity;
- victim’s psychological fragility/ particular vulnerability, her capacity for judgment, (lack of) sexual experience, or drunken/ intoxicated state;
- any ‘freezing’ during the acts;
- the acts’ impact on victim;
- perpetrator aware of her vulnerability, and/ or using a relationship of trust or status; circumstances conducive to coercion, such as deserted place or multiple aggressors. (§143)
Furthermore, the authorities failed to implement the law in practice: effective investigation and punishment for the perpetrator was lacking. E.A.’s complaint contained credible (anal) rape and other SV allegations, which were not investigated despite their particular gravity. (§§153-4) The investigation took insufficient account of the control exercised by the abuser and the severe impact on E.A.’s health. It was crucial to assess whether such circumstances allowed free consent. (§§156-9) The courts refused to consider rape and SV charges as no ‘violence, constraint, threat, or surprise’ was proven, in their view. Despite acknowledging E.A.’s fragility and her aggressor’s abuse of professional status, his professional threats, and his aggressive humiliation of her in professional situations, which had all eroded E.A.’s health and caused her to submit to him, they did not draw any conclusions from that context regarding her ‘consent’. (§161)
The facts had to be assessed in their professional context. (§165) The abuser exercised functional authority over E.A., his post giving him real power over her. E.A. was a young professional whose employment status depended on her success in a competition, which her abuser had threatened to intervene in. He was vindictive towards her and used his status to discredit and isolate her professionally. (§165)
E.A. is a landmark, recognising that, for judges to use past consent, especially in a coercive control context, in order to construct consent to a sexual act is revictimisation, blaming survivors and discouraging them from reporting SV. The Court has explicitly grounded the duty to refrain from such victim stigmatisation in respect for victims’ dignity, using dignity-based analysis to uphold victims’ rights.
E.A. is only the third case of SV impunity, after L. v. France and J.L. v. Italy, in which the Court has recognised judicial victim-shaming and blaming (‘guilt-inducing and stigmatising’ reasons) as revictimisation and a breach of the ECHR per se. In two other cases, respectively, workplace sexual harassment and online violence by a former partner (revenge porn), the Court recognised negative gender stereotyping as stigmatising and revictimising, however, in a limited manner and not as a separate breach (M.Ș.D. v. Romania, §147-8, see commentary; C v. Romania, §83-5, see commentary).
On the other hand, unlike L. v. France, but like earlier cases of judicial victim-blaming of SV survivors, in which the Court, despite finding revictimisation, simply refused to address discrimination complaints (commentary on this), E.A. ignores gender inequality as the root cause of such revictimisation. E.A. made no discrimination allegation, possibly influenced by the Court’s tendency to dismiss such allegations as ‘unnecessary’ (M.Ș.D. v. Romania, J.L. v. Italy) or as requiring evidence for Article 14 to even apply (C v. Romania). However, under international law, sexual harassment/ violence is unquestionably gendered. Under the Istanbul Convention (IC), sexual harassment is a form of violence against women (VAW).
Next, the Court did not qualify E.A.’s revictimisation as a breach of a negative State duty (to refrain from wrongdoing). It only found positive duties (to act protectively) were breached. (§171) This omission typifies the Court’s approach to judicial stigmatisation of SV/ GBV victims (L. v. France, J.L. v. Italy, M.Ș.D. v. Romania, C v. Romania). The Court stops short of condemning the domestic judges for what they did, framing it instead as something they let happen: they ‘exposed’ the victim to revictimisation rather than committed her revictimisation themselves (see critique).
Thursday, 23 October 2025
New Session of the MOOC on ECHR
Tuesday, 21 October 2025
New Book on Property under the ECHR
'The right to the peaceful enjoyment of property is one of the most frequently invoked rights in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It is also one of the most complex and least understood. Through the Convention's history, the protection of the right to property has undergone significant development in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. This book shows how the Court’s reliance on the Convention’s object and purpose – in particular the rule of law – has served as the main impetus for development. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the jurisprudence, the book analyses the arguments and clarifies the principles governing human rights protection of property rights.'

