Cruxifix in the Classroom Judgment

Religious symbols in public places have been a bone of contention in public discussions in many places around the world. Yesterday, the European Court added its contribution in the judgment Lautsi v. Italy. (Appl.no. 30814/06). The case concerned a complaint by a mother of children of 11 and 13 years old that the public school which they attended had a crucifix in each classroom. She contended that this was contrary to secularist principles by which she wanted to raise her children. Italian laws and regulations, partly dating from the Mussolini era, obliged public schools to display the crucifix in classrooms. In the Strasbourg proceedings Italy had argued that that the crucifix was not only a religious symbol, but also a symbol of Italian state and culture and therefore even could represent secularism. The reasoning of the Italian state, summarised in the judgment, is worth reading for the mere curiosity of its logic alone (even if one may understand the underlying concerns). The Court disagreed and found - unanimously - a violation of the freedom of religion (Art. 9 ECHR) jointly with the right to education (Art. 2 of Protocol 1). The Court, amongst others, took into account the nature of the religious symbol concerned (amongst the plurality of meanings, the Court held that the religious connotation of the crucifix was dominant) and its impact on young children. In two of the key paragraphs (para. 55-56) the Court held that the demands of pluralism in public schools called for a change in the Italian situation:

55. La présence du crucifix peut aisément être interprétée par des élèves de tous âges comme un signe religieux et ils se sentiront éduqués dans un environnement scolaire marqué par une religion donnée. Ce qui peut être encourageant pour certains élèves religieux, peut être perturbant émotionnellement pour des élèves d'autres religions ou ceux qui ne professent aucune religion. Ce risque est particulièrement présent chez les élèves appartenant à des minorités religieuses. La liberté négative n'est pas limitée à l'absence de services religieux ou d'enseignement religieux. Elle s'étend aux pratiques et aux symboles exprimant, en particulier ou en général, une croyance, une religion ou l'athéisme. Ce droit négatif mérite une protection particulière si c'est l'Etat qui exprime une croyance et si la personne est placée dans une situation dont elle ne peut se dégager ou seulement en consentant des efforts et un sacrifice disproportionnés.

56. L'exposition d'un ou plusieurs symboles religieux ne peut se justifier ni par la demande d'autres parents qui souhaitent une éducation religieuse conforme à leurs convictions, ni, comme le Gouvernement le soutient, par la nécessité d'un compromis nécessaire avec les partis politiques d'inspiration chrétienne. Le respect des convictions de parents en matière d'éducation doit prendre en compte le respect des convictions des autres parents. L'Etat est tenu à la neutralité confessionnelle dans le cadre de l'éducation publique obligatoire où la présence aux cours est requise sans considération de religion et qui doit chercher à inculquer aux élèves une pensée critique.

La Cour ne voit pas comment l'exposition, dans des salles de classe des écoles publiques, d'un symbole qu'il est raisonnable d'associer au catholicisme (la religion majoritaire en Italie) pourrait servir le pluralisme éducatif qui est essentiel à la préservation d'une « société démocratique » telle que la conçoit la Convention, pluralisme qui a été reconnu par la Cour constitutionnelle en droit interne.

One may note, that the Court thinks this applies in general in the exercise of public functions by the state and particularly (but not solely) in classrooms.

Italy has already indicated that it wants the Grand Chamber of the Court to have a look at the case. Even if the judgment was unanimous - which would decrease chances for reconsideration - this could happen since it is an issue which can be considered of major importance in many ECHR state parties. In addition, a bit more clarity would be welcome on the extent to which this judgment should be explained as a complete and aboslute ban on religious symbols in public schools (as the reasoning of the judgment seems to argue towards that conclusion) or simply that the obligation for public schools to display such symbols is contrary to the Convention (as the final part of the judgment seems to indicate as one of the key reasons for concluding that the Convention was violated). The judgment seems to lean towards the first of these two explanations. Some pragmatism might be called for here and this will certainly not be the end of the discussion of this issue.

For coverage in the European press, see the article in yesterday's Guardian newspaper here and in Le Monde here. Both newpapers report that the Italian government has classified the Court's ruling as ideologically motivated. The judgment has provoked strong reactions amongst Italians themselves as well, with a on online petition being signed by tens of thousands of people within a day. This is the report from the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, in which - one may note - the nationality of all the judges in the Chamber are mentioned (sic!).