The international legal framework regulating the problem of human trafficking contains the presumption that the return of victims of human trafficking to their countries of origin is the standard resolution for their cases. However, victims might have legitimate reasons for not wanting to go back. For those victims, resort to the legal framework of the European Convention on Human Rights could be a solution. I elaborate on the protection capacity of Article 3 when upon return victims face dangers of re-trafficking, retaliation, rejection by family and/or community and when upon return to the country of origin victims could be subjected to degrading treatment due to unavailability of social and medical assistance. In light of the Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia case, I develop an argument under Article 4 that states cannot send victims to those countries which do not meet the positive obligations standard as established in the case. Article 8 could be relevant: first, when the level of feared harm in the country of origin does not reach the severity of Article 3 but is sufficiently grave to be in breach of the right to private life and engage the non-refoulement principle, and second, when the victim has developed social ties within the receiving state and the removal will lead to their disruption.The second is an article on network neutrality on the internet and Article 10 ECHR by Jasper P. Sluijs, entitled 'From Competition to Freedom of Expression: Introducing Art. 10 ECHR in the European Network Neutrality Debate'. This is the abstract:
Network neutrality concerns a heated debate on the role of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) as a potential gate keeper for Internet access of end-users and online content providers. In line with standard practice in European telecommunications policy the European regulatory response to the issue of network neutrality has been framed mainly in economic terms. At the same time, European civil society organizations have interpreted network neutrality in terms of fundamental rights, particularly freedom of expression. Moreover, while the amended regulatory framework for telecommunications now includes explicit references to fundamental rights, it remains unclear if and how fundamental rights should be applied to network neutrality disputes. This article relates network neutrality to the rich body of Art. 10 ECHR case law, and asks to what extent this jurisprudence is of relevance to network neutrality discussions. The findings of this research reveal that the claim that network management by ISPs would violate end-users’ freedom of expression is less straightforward than often assumed. Moreover, the opposite case in which network neutrality regulation violates ISPs’ freedom of expression is less far-fetched than it may seem. These conclusions are meant to move the European discussion on network neutrality and fundamental rights beyond rhetoric, towards a more substantial and analytical approach.